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Abstract
This paper considers a new subsidy scheme for supporting the purchase of target prod-
ucts, in which the subsidy payment is inversely related to the product price. The scheme
makes the demand faced by producers more elastic, thereby reducing their power to raise
prices and increasing subsidy pass-through to consumers. Relative to the commonly-used
specific or ad valorem subsidy, it induces larger sales with the same government budget
(up to 50% more sales than the specific subsidy according to simulations based on the
U.S. electric vehicle market) and allows the policymaker to flexibly adjust the incidence
on producers.
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1 Introduction
There are numerous subsidy programs across countries that aim to promote the use of tar-
get goods. These programs partially offset the purchase or production cost through financial
incentives, such as grants, rebates, and tax credits/deductions, offered to their consumers or
producers. Target goods may relate to, for example, “green” products (e.g., electric cars and
solar PV panels), childcare and education (e.g., nursery), healthcare (e.g., treatment, insur-
ance, and pharmaceuticals), and housing (e.g., purchase and rental). Typically, the subsidy
payment per unit of a target good is either independent of or proportional to its price (“spe-
cific” or “ad valorem”).1 Sometimes it is given by a mixture of the two schemes (e.g., an ad
valorem subsidy with a cap as in reference pricing of pharmaceuticals). This paper considers a
*Department of Economics, University of Aberdeen, Edward Wright Building, Dunbar Street, Aberdeen, AB24
3QY, United Kingdom. tkiso@abdn.ac.uk.
1An income tax credit is in effect a specific subsidy of the amount of the credit, and an income tax deduction
is an ad valorem subsidy at the marginal income tax rate.
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2new subsidy form to be used in such programs, which embodies a mechanism to reduce the
producers’ capacity to raise prices and thus significantly enhances the efficiency of these pro-
grams in increasing the sales of subsidized products: simulations based on an actual electric
car subsidy in the U.S. indicate that switching from the current specific form to the proposed
form, holding the total government spending on the program constant, would increase the
market sales by up to 50%.
In many cases, the target good of a subsidy program is produced under imperfect compe-
tition, and/or associated with positive externalities or merit-good elements, so its supply
without a subsidy falls short of the socially efficient level. Also, it is often desirable from a
distributional perspective to help low- and middle-income households acquire such goods.
For these reasons, government subsidy programs intend to lower the effective price that con-
sumers pay out-of-pocket for the good, and thus encourage its usage.
Under imperfect competition, the design of a tax or subsidy policy (for example, specific or
ad valorem) has welfare implications.2 A number of previous studies use theoretical models
of imperfect competition in a closed-economy context, and analyze the relative efficiency of
different policy designs.3 On taxes, Suites and Musgrave (1953), Delipalla and Keen (1992),
Skeath and Trandel (1994), Anderson, de Palma and Kreider (2001a), and Hamilton (2009), to
name a handful, compare specific with ad valorem taxes. Myles (1996), Hamilton (1999), and
Carbonnier (2014) examine more general tax designs that contain specific and ad valorem taxes
as special cases, and their frameworks relate to the subsidy policy proposed here in that the
key channel is a policy-induced increase in the elasticity of demand faced by producers. On
subsidies, there are a limited number of papers on the issue: Valido et al. (2014) and Liang,
Wang and Chou (2017) contrast specific with ad valorem subsidies. This paper considers
another form of subsidies and compare it with the commonly-used specific and ad valorem
forms.
This paper has been motivated by a subsidy program in Japan that has a distinct feature not
observed in usual specific or ad valorem subsidy schemes. In this Japanese subsidy (rebate)
program on the purchase of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, the rebate amount
(per unit quantity) to a buyer is decreasing in the pre-rebate, unit price of the system, thereby
giving sellers and buyers an incentive to trade at lower (pre-rebate) prices. Specifically, Table
1 shows that as the transaction price of a solar PV system per kW of capacity (inclusive of
installation and other related costs) is lowered, the buyer (household) becomes eligible for
a higher subsidy per kW. For example, in 2012 a household received no rebate if the (pre-
rebate, per-kW) price of the purchased system was above U550,000; a rebate of U30,000 per
kW if it was between U475,001–U550,000; and U35,000 if it was equal to or below U475,000.4
2In contrast, under perfect competition where the firms are price-takers with no market power, the difference
in the design of tax/subsidy policies is insignificant.
3There are papers that investigate the difference between the specific and ad valorem forms of import tariffs or
export subsidies in an open-economy setting where domestic and foreign producers are treated differently (e.g.,
Brander and Spencer, 1984; Collie, 2006). This paper focuses on a closed-economy setting where producers are
treated equally regardless of nationality, and thus export subsidies are out of its scope.
4A similar policy design was adopted by a U.K. subsidy scheme for electric and hybrid vehicles in 2016: a
threshold at the vehicle price of £60,000.
3Table 1: Residential Solar PV Installation Subsidy in Japan
Fiscal Subsidy Condition on
year (U/kW) pre-rebate price ppre (U/kW)
2009 0 if 700, 000 < ppre
70,000 if ppre ≤ 700, 000
2010 0 if 650, 000 < ppre
70,000 if ppre ≤ 650, 000
2011 0 if 600, 000 < ppre
48,000 if ppre ≤ 600, 000
2012 0 if 550, 000 < ppre
30,000 if 475, 000 < ppre ≤ 550, 000
35,000 if ppre ≤ 475, 000
2013 0 if 500, 000 < ppre
15,000 if 410, 000 < ppre ≤ 500, 000
20,000 if ppre ≤ 410, 000
The table shows rebates (per kW of capacity) offered to
households for installing residential solar PV systems.
The amount of a rebate is conditional on the (pre-rebate)
transaction price (U/kW) of a system.
Source: Japan Photovoltaic Energy Association
The demand for a solar PV system jumps up as its price goes down below a threshold,
incentivizing sellers to take advantage of this structure. Thus, the policymakers expected
that the scheme would work as a mechanism to lower not only the consumer prices (i.e.,
post-rebate, out-of-pocket prices for households) but also the producer prices (i.e., pre-rebate,
transaction prices received by sellers), leading to more than full pass-through of the subsidy
to consumers and further accelerating the diffusion of solar PV systems that have positive
externalities. Note that introducing a specific or ad valorem subsidy on a good normally
reduces the consumer price and increases the producer price at the same time, resulting in
less than full pass-through of the subsidy to consumers.
Transaction data suggest that the subsidy design indeed worked well in lowering (pre-rebate)
prices. Figure 1 shows the (pre-rebate) price distribution of household solar PV systems
that were installed during fiscal year 2012 (April 2012–March 2013). Solar PV system prices
bunch in the bins just below the threshold prices (U475,000 and U550,000), indicating that
sellers have price-setting power, take account of the subsidy rule, and make transactions at
lower prices than they would without such a scheme. As the threshold prices were reduced
significantly year by year, the subsidy design, together with the declining production costs,
helped lower the (pre-rebate) prices and further accelerate the diffusion of the technology
until the national subsidy program was phased out in 2014 following a rapid expansion of
residential solar PV.
4Figure 1: Distribution of Residential Solar PV System Prices (2012)
Source: RTS Cooporation and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Despite the thought-provoking observation, no previous research exists, to my knowledge,
that uses an economics framework to analyze the effect of making subsidy payment condi-
tional on and inversely related to the price of a target product. This paper proposes and eval-
uates such a new subsidy scheme. More specifically, the subsidy considered is offered for the
purchase or production of a good on the condition that its price is less than a government-
set threshold, and as the price goes down, the subsidy per unit of the good increases in
proportion to the difference between the threshold and price.5 That is, the government sets
two policy parameters: the threshold price level, and the rate at which subsidy payment in-
creases with price reduction (pi and r, respectively, in the model below). Based on a model of
imperfect competition (Bertrand oligopoly with product differentiation) and the theory of su-
permodular games, I contrast this inversely price-related (IPR) subsidy with the benchmark
case of no subsidy and widely-used specific and ad valorem subsidies in terms of various
equilibrium characteristics (e.g., output, price, profits, and government expenditure).
From the government’s perspective, the advantages of the proposed design consist in effi-
ciency and flexibility. First, the IPR design is more efficient than the specific or ad valorem
design in the sense that the former requires less government spending than the latter for
inducing the same output level through subsidization. Equivalently, with a given budget,
the IPR form can generate a higher output than the specific or ad valorem form. The relative
efficiency of the IPR form follows because it makes the demand curve faced by the producers
more elastic. In effect, the scheme partially compensates the producers for cutting prices, so
a $1 reduction in the consumer price can be achieved by a smaller reduction in the producer
5With the subsidy schedule in Table 1, subsidy payment and consequently demand is discontinuous at the
threshold prices. For tractability, the paper considers a subsidy design that is continuous in the price of the good.
5price. This means that they face more elastic demand than under no subsidy, and under the
specific or ad valorem scheme. Elastic demand erodes the producers’ power to raise prices,
thus making it easier for the policymaker to induce lower prices (higher outputs).
Second, the other side of the coin is that in inducing a given output level, the IPR scheme
allows the policymaker to pursue an additional goal of adjusting the incidence on the pro-
ducers. Given a target output to be induced, the policymaker can choose the two policy
parameters to make a firm’s equilibrium profits higher or lower than the case of no sub-
sidy. In other words, besides targeting an output level, the policymaker can in effect choose
whether the scheme works as subsidization or implicit taxation on the producers and to what
extent, depending on the policymaker’s objectives and market situations. For example, while
increasing the supply and consumption of subsidized goods, the IPR form can also be used
to financially support the producers of an emerging industry (such as electric carmakers) or
instead to lower the economic rents due to imperfect competition. This flexibility does not
hold for specific or ad valorem subsidies because they have just one policy parameter, and the
policymaker’s choice of it determines the equilibrium output and profits at once.
Simulations based on actual market data reveal substantial impacts of the IPR scheme. I
construct a market using the data from the 2017 U.S. electric vehicle market where buyers
were eligible for a specific subsidy of $7,500. This constructed market is then used to simulate
the impact of replacing the original specific subsidy of $7,500 with an IPR subsidy in such a
way that the market sales or the total government budget on the subsidy program remains
constant. The results suggest that in inducing the same market sales, the IPR form can reduce
the subsidy payment per unit by up to $4,600–$5,100 (61–68%). Put another way, the IPR form
can induce up to 48–50% more sales with the same government budget ($382 million) as in
the original specific form. As to the incidence on the producers, in spending the budget of
$382 million, the government can adjust the parameters of the IPR scheme to flexibly vary
producer surplus between $227–251 million higher and $10–16 million lower than in the case
of no government intervention.
The IPR form shares with the widely-used ad valorem tax the issue of the disincentive for prod-
uct quality improvement. In both cases, quality improvement is made more costly because
an increase in the pre-subsidy/tax price due to higher quality reduces (increases) subsidy
(tax) payment. I show that this disincentive under the IPR form can be corrected in a simple
way: making the price threshold for subsidy eligibility increasing in quality, and thus reward-
ing a higher-quality product with a larger subsidy payment. In practice, this result implies
that the IPR form works better when information is available about product attributes (e.g.,
energy-efficient durable goods and pharmaceuticals).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers Bertrand competition under
various subsidy policies and derives Nash equilibrium(a). Section 3 analyzes the govern-
ment’s choice of policy variables, and compares equilibrium outcomes of different policies.
Section 4 evaluates the impacts of the IPR scheme through simulations based on an actual
U.S. subsidy program on electric vehicles. Section 5 extends the analysis by discussing how
6the IPR scheme can be adjusted to remove the disincentive for quality improvement. Section
6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Subsidy Policies and Nash Equilibria
Consider a market with n (≥ 2) firms, where each firm i produces a differentiated product
with a constant marginal cost ci(> 0). The demand for firm i’s product, qi, is given by
qi = Qi(pi, p−i), where Qi : R+ ×Rn−1+ → R+ is a continuous function, pi is the price of firm
i’s product, and p−i is a vector of the prices of all the other n− 1 firms’ products.6
For each i, the demand function Qi has the following properties. It is decreasing in pi and
strictly so where Qi > 0. It is also increasing in pj for any j 6= i and strictly so where Qi > 0
and Qj > 0 (i.e., products are gross substitutes to one another). Also, I make the following
common assumption in the literature of supermodular games, a powerful toolbox for ana-
lyzing strategic complementarity as featured in Bertrand models with product differentiation
(e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Vives, 2005; Amir, 2005): given pi ≥ p′i and p−i ≥ p′−i (i.e.,
pj ≥ p′j for all j 6= i),
Qi(pi, p−i)Qi(p′i, p
′
−i) ≥ Qi(pi, p′−i)Qi(p′i, p−i), (2)
which means that log Qi displays increasing differences in pi and p−i (where Qi > 0):
log Qi(pi, p−i)− log Qi(p′i, p−i) ≥ log Qi(pi, p′−i)− log Qi(p′i, p′−i). (3)
In the case that Qi is twice continuously differentiable, (3) is equivalent to the condition that
for each j ( 6= i),
∂2 log Qi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂pj
=
1
Qi(pi, p−i)2
[Qi(pi, p−i)
∂2Qi(pi, p−i)
∂pi∂pj
− ∂Qi(pi, p−i)
∂pi
∂Qi(pi, p−i)
∂pj
] ≥ 0.
(4)
An intuitive and exact economic interpretation of (4) is that the own price-elasticity of de-
mand (− piQi
∂Qi
∂pi
) is decreasing in the price of another product (i.e., the demand for product i
becomes less own-price elastic as pj goes up). This condition is satisfied by a large class of de-
mand functions, including, among others, linear, logit, CES, and translog demand functions
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Note that no assumption is made on the concavity or convexity
6The demand function qi = Qi(pi, p−i) can be regarded as resulting from the following optimization problem
of a representative consumer with quasi-linear utility U(x, q1, · · · , qn) = x + u(q1, · · · , qn) (see Vives (1999, Ch. 3)
for details):
max
x,q1,··· ,qn
x + u(q1, · · · , qn) s.t. x +∑
i
piqi ≤ I, (1)
where x is the numéraire good (the composite of all goods other than the n products) and I is income. An interior
solution is characterized by ∂u(q1,··· ,qn)∂qi = pi ∀i, so that the inverse demand function for product i is expressed
as pi(q1, · · · , qn) = ∂u(q1,··· ,qn)∂qi ∀i. Inverting the system of inverse demand functions gives the demand function
for each product i as qi = Qi(p1, · · · , pn). Lastly, with quali-linear utility, the assumption of a representative
consumer is not restrictive.
7of Qi or log Qi.
[Policy A: No Subsidy]
We first look into the baseline case in which no subsidy is provided. Consider Bertrand
competition by n(≥ 2) firms: given p−i, firm i maximizes its profits
piiA(pi, p−i) = (pi − ci)Qi(pi, p−i) (5)
by setting its price pi in the interval [ci, pmax], where pmax is sufficiently large to choke the
demand for any of the n products irrespective of the prices of the other n− 1 products. Let
ψiA be the correspondence from ∏j 6=i[cj, pmax] to [ci, pmax] that gives firm i’s best response(s)
to p−i under Policy A.
[Policy B: Specific Subsidy]
Suppose that the government offers consumers a specific subsidy of z per unit of the good
purchased, where z > 0 and z < ci for all i. The subsidy is provided as a rebate or tax credit,
for example. Importantly, it makes no difference whether the direct recipients of the subsidy
are consumers or producers (physical neutrality; see, e.g., Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). The
paper mainly works in terms of consumption subsidies (offered directly to consumers), but
its results are valid for production subsidies (offered directly to producers) as well.
We interpret pi as the consumer price, or the the effective price that consumers pay out
of pocket after accounting for the subsidy. Demand depends on this effective price. The
producer price ppi (i.e., the price received by a firm) equals pi + z. Thus, firm i sets the price
pi ∈ [ci − z, pmax] to maximize its profits
piiB(pi, p−i) = (pi + z− ci)Qi(pi, p−i). (6)
Let ψiB be the correspondence from ∏j 6=i[cj − z, pmax] to [ci − z, pmax] that gives firm i’s best
response(s) to p−i under Policy B.
[Policy C: Ad Valorem Subsidy]
Suppose that the government offers consumers an ad valorem subsidy of vpi per unit of the
good purchased (v > 0). As under Policy B, the consumer price is pi, and the producer price
is (1+ v)pi. Thus, firm i sets the price pi ∈ [ ci1+v , pmax] to maximize its profits
piiC(pi, p−i) = [(1+ v)pi − ci]Qi(pi, p−i). (7)
Let ψiC be the correspondence from ∏j 6=i[
cj
1+v , p
max] to [ ci1+v , p
max] that gives firm i’s best re-
sponse(s) to p−i under Policy C.
The theory of supermodular games is known to be useful for analyzing Bertrand competition
(e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Vives, 2005; Amir, 2005). (2) implies that for X ∈ {A, B, C},
8logpiiX satisfies increasing differences in pi and p−i,7 making each Bertrand competition a log-
supermodular game (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Therefore, under each of Policies
A–C, there exists at least one (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium p∗ such that p∗ = ΨX(p∗),
where ΨX(p) ≡ ψ1X(p−1) × · · · × ψnX(p−n) for X ∈ {A, B, C}. Moreover, in the case of
multiple Nash equilibria, there exists a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium, where every firm’s
price is higher than its price at any other Nash equilibrium, that Pareto-dominates other Nash
equilibria and thus is most plausible.
[Policy D: IPR Subsidy]
The government conditionally offers consumers a subsidy that is inversely related to the price
of the target product. No subsidy is provided if the consumer price is greater than or equal to
a government-set threshold pi (i.e., if pi ≥ pi). If the price is below pi, the subsidy per unit of
the good increases linearly as the price decreases. Specifically, if pi < pi, a subsidy of r[pi − pi]
is provided per unit of the good (i.e., the producer price ppi = pi + r[pi− pi]), where 0 < r < 1
and rpi < ci < pi ∀i.8,9 The threshold pi may vary across i (Section 5 considers an extension
where pi depends on product i’s quality).
Noting that profits equal zero when pi =
ci−rpi
1−r (< ci), let piiD0 : ∏j[
cj−rpj
1−r , p
max] → R+ be the
function defined by
piiD0(pi, p−i) = [pi + r(pi − pi)− ci]Qi(pi, p−i). (10)
Let ψiD0 be the correspondence from ∏j 6=i[
cj−rpj
1−r , p
max] to [ ci−rpi1−r , p
max] that gives the max-
imizer(s) of (10) with respect to pi ∈ [ ci−rpi1−r , pmax], conditional on p−i. Define ΨD0(p) ≡
ψ1D0(p−1) × · · · × ψnD0(p−n). As under Policies A–C, the theory of supermodular games
implies that there exists at least one fixed point p∗ such that p∗ = ΨD0(p∗).
7Given pi ≥ p′i and p−i ≥ p′−i, it follows from (2) that
piiA(pi, p−i)piiA(p′i , p
′
−i) = (pi − ci)(p′i − ci)Qi(pi, p−i)Qi(p′i , p′−i)
≥ (pi − ci)(p′i − ci)Qi(pi, p′−i)Qi(p′i , p−i)
= piiA(pi, p′−i)piiA(p
′
i , p−i).
(8)
Thus, logpiiA satisfies increasing differences in pi and p−i (where piiA > 0):
logpiiA(pi, p−i)− logpiiA(pi, p′−i) ≥ logpiiA(p′i , p−i)− logpiiA(p′i , p′−i). (9)
It is shown analogously that logpiiX satisfies increasing differences in pi and p−i for each X ∈ {A, B, C, D0},
where the case D0 is to be defined next.
8These assumptions set the range on the generosity of the subsidy. The assumption r < 1 ensures dppi /dpi =
1− r > 0, so that the subsidy is not so generous that the producer price can be raised by lowering the consumer
price pi. The assumption ci < pi means that the subsidy is generous enough to give positive profits for marginal
cost pricing (pi = ci), while rpi < ci means that it is not so generous that even the price of zero does not result in
losses.
9Subsidy payment r[pi − pi](= ppi − pi) is defined in terms of the consumer price pi. Alternatively, it can
be expressed with the producer price ppi as r
p[pi − ppi ], where the parameter rp differs from r, while pi is, by
construction of the policy, identical to the one in the consumer price-based definition above. Equating the values
from the two definitions gives ppi − pi = r[pi − pi] = rp[pi − p
p
i ]. Rearranging this, we obtain r
p = r/(1− r).
Since the function g : (0, 1) → (0,∞) with g(r) = r/(1− r) is bijective (one-to-one and onto), it does not matter
whether the subsidy is defined in terms of the consumer or producer price.
9Depending on the relative magnitude of pi and pi, firm i’s profits under Policy D, denoted by
piiD(pi, p−i), equals either piiD0(pi, p−i) or piiA(pi, p−i) (its profits under Policy A):
piiD(pi, p−i) =
piiA(pi, p−i) if pi ≥ pi,piiD0(pi, p−i) if pi ≤ pi, (11)
where by definition piiA(pi, p−i) = piiD0(pi, p−i) if pi = pi, so piiD(pi, p−i) is continuous.
A few comments follow about the setup of the policy. Since piD0(pi, p−i) = [(1− r)pi + rpi −
ci]Qi(pi, p−i), Policy D is viewed as a combination of an ad valorem tax with the rate of r (> 0)
and a specific subsidy of rpi, with a non-negativity constraint that subsidy payment equals
max{r(pi − pi), 0}. The constraint reflects the subsidy eligibility condition and keeps the
product, which is typically associated with social benefits such as positive externalities, from
being taxed even if it is priced high. Viewed as a dual scheme with ad valorem and specific
elements, Policy D is related with the model of Myles (1996) (or the more generalized model
of Hamilton (1999)) that discusses such a scheme within the context of commodity taxation
(i.e., for the case of r(pi − pi) < 0 or pi < pi) and under a homogeneous-product Cournot
framework with identical firms (as opposed to this paper’s differentiated-product Bertrand
framework with heterogeneous firms).10
As this paper considers subsidization, the non-negativity constraint is essential: it does not
make sense that the government imposes a special tax on, for example, solar PV systems
when it aims to encourage their diffusion. Thus, each firm, which strategically interacts with
other firms, individually selects its subsidy calculation rule (r(pi− pi) or 0) by setting its price
lower or higher than pi. In other words, the policymaker in my model can only induce each
firm to opt in to the scheme by making r and pi sufficiently attractive for the firm (where
the threshold values of r and pi for firm i’s opt-in/out are endogenously determined through
market interaction among the firms). This setting can result in multiple Nash equilibria in
which each firm chooses to opt in to or out of the scheme and earn positive profits. This
is in contrast with the analysis on taxation and Ramsey pricing by Myles (1996), where the
rule r(pi − pi) (< 0) is imposed on all firms, leading to a unique corner (limit) solution (with
r = 1) that achieves Ramsey pricing by essentially enforcing marginal cost pricing and zero
profits on the firms.
Setting the non-negativity constraint aside, note also that the dual scheme works fundamen-
tally differently from an economic policy perspective depending on whether it calculates tax
payment, −r(pi − pi) (> 0 for pi > pi), or subsidy payment, r(pi − pi) (> 0 for pi < pi). As
a tax scheme, it exhibits the standard property shared by almost all tax or subsidy schemes
that tax or subsidy payment is non-decreasing in the price pi. As a subsidy scheme, on the
other hand, it has a unique feature that subsidy payment is strictly decreasing in pi, as in the
motivating example of the solar PV subsidy described in Section 1.
We now proceed to a detailed analysis of the theoretical model with Policy D added. First,
10The product rpi in this paper is treated in Myles (1996) and Hamilton (1999) as a single parameter represent-
ing the specific tax element.
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based on Topkis’s (1978) monotonicity theorem, the following lemma confirms the intuition
that subsidy payment lowers the optimal (consumer) price set by firm i in response to p−i. In
what follows, we focus on the non-trivial cases in which producing a positive quantity is firm
i’s best response (i.e., Qi(pbiX, p−i) > 0, where p
b
iX ∈ ψiX(p−i) for X ∈ {A, B, C, D0}).
Lemma 1. Given p−i ∈ ∏j 6=i[cj, pmax], pbiA ≥ pbiB, pbiA ≥ pbiC, and pbiA ≥ pbiD0 , where pbiA ∈
ψiA(p−i), pbiB ∈ ψiB(p−i), pbiC ∈ ψiC(p−i), and pbiD0 ∈ ψiD0(p−i).
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Next, Lemma 2 below shows that the property of increasing differences holds under Policy D
as in the previous cases.
Lemma 2. The function logpiiD satisfies increasing differences in pi and p−i, where piiD is defined in
(11).
Proof. See the Appendix. 
As is the case with Policies A–C, Lemma 2 and the theory of supermodular games imply that
there exists at least one (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium under Policy D.
With the existence a Nash equilibrium ensured under Policy D, I now derive firm i’s best re-
sponse correspondence ψiD from ∏j 6=i[
cj−rpj
1−r , p
max] to [ ci−rpi1−r , p
max], and then consider an illus-
trative example of a duopoly with linear demand. With ΨD(p) ≡ ψ1D(p−1)× · · · ×ψnD(p−n),
a Nash equilibrium p∗ under Policy D is determined by the equation p∗ = ΨD(p∗). Given
policy parameters r and pi, let Gi(p−i) be the difference between maxpi∈[ci ,pmax ] piiA(pi, p−i)
and max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD0(pi, p−i), where maximization is unconditional on the (in)eligibility
conditions given in (11). That is, with pbiA ∈ ψiA(p−i) and pbiD0 ∈ ψiD0(p−i),
Gi(p−i) ≡ piiA(pbiA, p−i)− piiD0(pbiD0 , p−i)
= [pbiA − ci] ·Qi(pbiA, p−i)− [(1− r)pbiD0 + rpi − ci] ·Qi(pbiD0 , p−i).
(12)
The following lemma states that a firm’s choice of opting in or out is governed simply by the
sign of Gi(p−i), or the relative benefits of opting in and out. This means that the (in)eligibility
conditions in (11) can be ignored in deriving the optimal responses because they are implied
by the sign on Gi(p−i) (as shown in Lemma 5 in the Appendix).
Lemma 3. The maximized profits under Policy D are as follows: for pbiA ∈ ψiA(p−i) and pbiD0 ∈
ψiD0(p−i),
max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD(pi, p−i) =
piiA(pbiA, p−i) if Gi(p−i) ≥ 0,piiD0(pbiD0 , p−i) if Gi(p−i) ≤ 0. (13)
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p2
p1
p
p
pˇ2
p1 = ψ1D(p2) =
{
ψ1A(p2) =
γ1
2β1
p2 + α12β1 +
c1
2 if p2 ≥ pˇ2,
ψ1D0 (p2) =
γ1
2β1
p2 + α12β1 +
c1−rp
2(1−r) if p2 ≤ pˇ2.(
pˇ2 = 1γ1 [−α1 + β1(p +
p−c1√
1−r )]
)
pˇ1
p2 = ψ2D(p1) =
{
ψ2A(p1) =
γ2
2β2
p1 +
α2
2β2
+ c22 if p1 ≥ pˇ1,
ψ2D0 (p1) =
γ2
2β2
p1 +
α2
2β2
+
c2−rp
2(1−r) if p1 ≤ pˇ1.(
pˇ1 = 1γ2 [−α2 + β2(p +
p−c2√
1−r )]
)
p∗2A
p∗1A
p∗2D0
p∗1D0
Figure 2: Duopoly under Linear Demand and Policy D
Equivalently, the best response correspondence under Policy D is
ψiD(p−i) =

ψiA(p−i) if Gi(p−i) > 0,
ψiD0(p−i) if Gi(p−i) < 0,
ψiA(p−i) ∪ ψiD0(p−i) if Gi(p−i) = 0.
(14)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
As an illustration, let us look at a duopoly case (n = 2) with linear demand functions:
q1 = Q1(p1, p2) = α1 − β1 p1 + γ1 p2,
q2 = Q2(p2, p1) = α2 − β2 p2 + γ2 p1,
(15)
where αi, βi, and γi, i = 1, 2, are all positive. It is straightforward to confirm that this demand
system satisfies the conditions stated at the beginning of Section 2.1, including the property
of increasing differences. Given r and p1 = p2 = p, Figure 2 depicts each firm’s best response
correspondence, ψ1D or ψ2D, as well as two Nash equilibria. In this case, Gi(pj) < 0 (= 0,
> 0) if pj < pˇj (= pˇj, > pˇj, respectively), where pˇj = 1γi [−αi + βi(p +
p−ci√
1−r )]. Thus, as the
other firm’s price pj increases, firm i’s best response ψiD jumps up at pj = pˇj to switch from
pi = ψiD0(pj) =
γi
2βi
pj +
αi
2βi
+ ci−rp2(1−r) to pi = ψiA(pj) =
γi
2βi
pj +
αi
2βi
+ ci2 . Intuitively, given
strategic complementarity of Bertrand competition, when firm j sets a sufficiently high price,
firm i should also set a high price (> p) even if it means becoming ineligible for the subsidy.
A more generous subsidy scheme (i.e., a larger r or p) raises pˇj, extending the range of pj in
which firm i responds with ψiD0(·) (i.e., by opting in to the scheme).
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The Nash equilibria under Policy D are where p1 = ψ1D(p2) and p2 = ψ2D(p1) intersect. In
Figure 2, there are two Nash equilibria: the intersection of p1 = ψ1A(p2) and p2 = ψ2A(p1),
(p∗1A, p
∗
2A), and the intersection of p1 = ψ1D0(p2) and p2 = ψ2D0(p1), (p
∗
1D0 , p
∗
2D0). Depending
on the values of demand, cost, and policy parameters, which determine where each firm’s
best response correspondence jumps, these two points may not lie on the best response (solid
line) of at least one firm and cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, depending on the
parameter values, there could exist a Nash equilibrium where one firm opts in and the other
opts out (the intersection of p1 = ψ1A(p2) and p2 = ψ2D0(p1) or that of p1 = ψ1D0(p2) and
p2 = ψ2A(p1)). As discussed above, given a set of parameters, the theory of supermodular
games ensures that at least one of these four points is an intersection of p1 = ψ1D(p2) and
p2 = ψ2D(p1), and thus is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games
To explore the paper’s primary goal of comparing different subsidy schemes in the next
section, I focus on the case of identical firms which have a common marginal cost c and face a
symmetrically differentiated demand system (as in Weyl and Fabinger (2013) and Anderson,
de Palma and Kreider (2001b)). The firms are also subject to a common eligibility threshold
p. This makes the game symmetric (i.e., unaffected by permutations of the firms), so the
subscript i is dropped from the functions Qi, piiX, ψiX (for X ∈ {A, B, C, D0, D}), and Gi. I
analyze Nash equilibria under each subsidy policy. The inequality in (3) is now assumed
to hold strictly when pi > p′i and p−i > p
′
−i (i.e., pj ≥ p′j for all j 6= i and p−i 6= p′−i),11
which implies that all Nash equilibria are symmetric (Vives, 1999, Ch. 2).12 Thus, it suffices
to look into firm i’s best response when all the other firms set a common price p0 and the
resulting fixed points where p0 ∈ ψX(p0, p0, · · · , p0). For brevity of notation, let Q˜(pi, p0) ≡
Q(pi, p0, · · · , p0) and analogously define p˜iX(pi, p0), ψ˜X(p0), and G˜(p0). As discussed in
Section 2.1, for each X ∈ {A, B, C, D0, D}, the set of Nash equilibria (fixed points) such that
p ∈ ψ˜X(p) is non-empty, which is denoted by FX (for example, FA ≡ {p|p ∈ ψ˜A(p)}). If there
are multiple Nash equilibria in FX, p∗X ≡ max{p|p ∈ FX} constitutes the strictly Pareto-best
(in terms of piX) Nash equilibrium (fixed point) in FX (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).13
The next lemma characterizes Nash equilibria under the IPR scheme (FD) for the symmetric
case:
Lemma 4. FD = {p|p ∈ FA and G˜(p) ≥ 0} ∪ {p|p ∈ FD0 and G˜(p) ≤ 0}. Moreover, if there exist
pA and pD0 such that pA ∈ FD ∩ FA and pD0 ∈ FD ∩ FD0 , then pD0 ≤ p ≤ pA (so pD0 < pA unless
pA = pD0 = p), and p˜iD(pD0 , pD0) ≤ p˜iD(pA, pA) (with equality if and only if pA = pD0 = p).
11That is, log Q satisfies strictly increasing differences in pi and p−i.
12It is proved by contradiction that ΨX(p) ≡ ψX(p−1) × · · · × ψX(p−n) (for X ∈ {A, B, C, D0, D}) has no
asymmetric fixed point under this setting. If one exists, there are (at least) two firms (denoted by 1 and 2) such
that p1 6= p2 at the fixed point. Without loss of generality, assume p1 < p2. Note that p1 ∈ ψX(p2, p3, · · · , pn)
and p2 ∈ ψX(p1, p3, · · · , pn). Since (3) with a strict inequality implies that every selection of ψX is increasing
in each argument (see, e.g., Vives, 2005, Lemma 1), it follows from p1 < p2, p1 ∈ ψX(p2, p3, · · · , pn), and p2 ∈
ψX(p1, p3, · · · , pn) that p1 ≥ p2, which is a clear contradiction.
13Given two fixed points p and p′ in FX such that p > p′, p˜iX(p, p) ≥ p˜iX(p′, p) > p˜iX(p′, p′), where the last
inequality holds because (1) p > p′ and (2) Qi and consequently piiX are strictly increasing in pj for any j 6= i
(from the assumptions stated at the beginning of Section 2.1 and above Lemma 1).
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
That is, FD consists of a subset of FA where opting out is the best response despite the possi-
bility of receiving the IPR subsidy, and a subset of FD0 where opting in is the best response to
the IPR subsidy. If both opt-in and opt-out Nash equilibria exist,14 the price and profits are
always higher at an opt-out equilibrium than at an opt-in equilibrium, except for an unlikely
case of pA = pD0 = p.
3 Comparing the Outcomes of Different Policies
I have so far looked into firm behavior and market equilibria under exogenous subsidy poli-
cies. I now consider a government’s choice of the structure and parameter(s) of its subsidy
policy, where the subsidy aims to increase social and consumer surplus by lowering the (con-
sumer) price of a good and thus stimulating its sales/consumption.
Policies A–D are compared in the following setting. I consider identical firms and a symmet-
rically differentiated demand system and focus on the (strictly) Pareto-best fixed points p∗A,
p∗B, p
∗
C, and p
∗
D0 (as discussed in Section 2.2), each of which is the the most plausible outcome
within FA, FB, FC, and FD0 , respectively. Suppose that the government sets Policy B, C, or
D (z, v, or r and p) with a view to inducing each firm to reduce its (consumer) price from
the no-subsidy level (p∗A) to a common target level pˆ (i.e., pˆ = p
∗
B = p
∗
C = p
∗
D0).
15 Equiva-
lently, it aims to raise its output from the no-subsidy level, q∗A = Q˜(p
∗
A, p
∗
A) = Q(p
∗
A, · · · , p∗A),
to a common target level, Q˜( pˆ, pˆ) = Q( pˆ, · · · , pˆ). This section compares the effectiveness
of alternative subsidy forms in terms of the government spending needed to achieve the
common target (see Anderson, de Palma and Kreider (2001b) for a similar approach to com-
paring specific and ad valorem taxes). The following argument assumes interior solutions
for profit maximization and a twice continuously differentiable demand function. Define
Q˜1(pi, p0) ≡ ∂Q˜(pi ,p0)∂pi =
∂Q(pi ,p0,··· ,p0)
∂pi
. Notationally, the dependence of the functions p˜iX (or
piX), where X ∈ {B, C, D0, D}, and G˜ (or G) on policy parameters (z, v, or r and p) has so far
been suppressed, but it is made explicit in the following for clarity (e.g., p˜iD0(pi, p0; r, p) and
G˜(p0; r, p)).
[Policy B]
The first order condition (FOC) for maximizing p˜iB(pi, p0; z) = (pi + z − c)Q˜(pi, p0) that is
satisfied at the symmetric Nash equilibrium pi = p = p∗B is
Q˜(p∗B, p
∗
B) + (p
∗
B + z− c)Q˜1(p∗B, p∗B) = 0.16 (16)
14As seen below, it is often the case that only one of these two types can be Nash equilibria.
15If no externalities are associated with the consumption/production of the good, social surplus (= consumer
surplus + producer surplus − government expenditure) is maximized when pˆ = c (social optimum). With
positive externalities, which are often the very reason for subsidization but not considered explicitly in this paper,
the socially optimal pˆ becomes lower than c. Note that the following analysis is not about setting pˆ optimally and
thus it holds more generally for pˆ such that pˆ < p∗A.
16Additionally, the second order condition that Q˜(p,p)Q˜11(p,p)
[Q˜1(p,p)]2
≤ 2 needs to hold at p = p∗B, which limits the
14
With the government target pˆ (< p∗A) given, solving (16) for z and letting p
∗
B = pˆ shows that
z = −( pˆ− c)− Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
≡ σB( pˆ) (17)
induces pˆ as the Pareto-best Nash equilibrium p = p∗B under Policy B.
[Policy C]
Similarly, the FOC for maximizing p˜iC(pi, p0; v) = [(1 + v)pi − c]Q˜(pi, p0) that is satisfied at
the symmetric Nash equilibrium pi = p = p∗C is
(1+ v)Q˜(p∗C, p
∗
C) + [(1+ v)p
∗
C − c]Q˜1(p∗C, p∗C) = 0. (18)
Thus, solving (18) for v and letting p∗C = pˆ shows that v =
cQ˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)+ pˆQ˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
− 1 induces pˆ as the
Pareto-best Nash equilibrium p = p∗C under Policy C, and the subsidy payment per unit (vpˆ)
equals
pˆcQ˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜( pˆ, pˆ) + pˆQ˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
− pˆ ≡ σC( pˆ). (19)
[Policy D]
The FOC for maximizing p˜iD0(pi, p0; r, p) = [(1− r)pi + rp− c]Q˜(pi, p0) that is satisfied at the
symmetric Nash equilibrium pi = p = p∗D0 is
(1− r)Q˜(p∗D0 , p∗D0) + [(1− r)p∗D0 + rp− c]Q˜1(p∗D0 , p∗D0) = 0. (20)
Thus, setting r and p in such a way to meet the FOC
(1− r)Q˜( pˆ, pˆ) + [(1− r) pˆ + rp− c]Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ) = 0 (21)
realizes pˆ as the Pareto-best fixed point p∗D0 within FD0 . From (21), p is given as a function of
r conditional on pˆ (denoted by p(r; pˆ)), and dp(r;pˆ)dr < 0.
17 Hereafter, p is eliminated by using
(21), which means that when we consider below the effect of changing r conditional on pˆ, we
also implicitly change p to satisfy (21), and we observe the total effect of the changes in both
r and p.
Below I discuss three propositions on Nash equilibria under this policy and how they compare
to those under previous policies. Figure 3 then summarizes the main findings from these
propositions.
First, we investigate the conditions on r (and p through (21)) under which pˆ = p∗D0 ∈ FD0 is
convexity of the demand curve at the optimum and corresponds to the usual condition under Cournot competition
that a firm’s marginal revenue curve should not be upward sloping at an optimum. Analogous conditions should
hold under Policies C and D to be discussed below.
17 p = [c− Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
− pˆ]/r + Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
+ pˆ, and dpdr = [
Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
+ pˆ− c]/r2 < 0, where the last inequality follows
because (21) and the assumption p > c imply Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
+ pˆ = c−rp1−r < c.
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also in FD (i.e., a Nash equilibrium under Policy D). Let r2 be determined as follows: given
the government target pˆ and pj = p∗A for all j( 6= i), r2 makes firm i indifferent between opt-
ing in and out, that is, between ψ˜D0(p
∗
A) and p
∗
A ∈ ψ˜A(p∗A). Mathematically, p˜iA(p∗A, p∗A) =
p˜iD0(p
b
D0(p
∗
A), p
∗
A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)), where p
b
D0(p
∗
A) ∈ ψ˜D0(p∗A),18 or G˜(p∗A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)) = 0. Sim-
ilarly, given the government target pˆ and pj = pˆ for all j( 6= i), r3 makes firm i indiffer-
ent between opting in and out, that is, between pˆ ∈ ψ˜D0( pˆ) and ψ˜A( pˆ). Mathematically,
p˜iA(pbA( pˆ), pˆ) = p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r3, p(r3; pˆ)) or G˜( pˆ; r3, p(r3; pˆ)) = 0. The following proposition gives
the range of r (and p by (21)) in which p = pˆ or p = p∗A constitutes a Nash equilibrium under
Policy D.
Proposition 1. Given pˆ (< p∗A), r2 ≤ r3. Moreover,
1. if r < r2, then pˆ ∈ FD and pA /∈ FD for any pA ∈ FA (i.e., p∗D0 = pˆ is realized as a Nash
equilibrium under Policy D, but any pA ∈ FA, including p∗A, is not);
2. if r2 ≤ r ≤ r3, then pˆ ∈ FD and p∗A ∈ FD.
3. if r3 < r, then pˆ /∈ FD and p∗A ∈ FD.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
If p∗A and p
∗
D0 are respectively a unique fixed point of ψ˜A(·) and ψ˜D0(·) (as is the case with
linear, logit, and CES demand systems, for example), this proposition is simplified to the
following more intuitive corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that p∗A and p
∗
D0 = pˆ are respectively a unique element of FA and FD0 . Then,
1. if r < r2, Policy D induces a unique equilibrium p = p∗D0 = pˆ;
2. if r2 ≤ r ≤ r3, Policy D induces two Nash equilibria p = p∗D0 = pˆ and p = p∗A.
3. if r3 < r, Policy D induces a unique equilibrium p = p∗A.
By Proposition 1, if r ≤ r3, p = p∗D0 = pˆ is a Nash equilibrium and the subsidy payment per
unit (i.e., r(p− pˆ) with (21) satisfied) in this equilibrium is
− ( pˆ− c)− (1− r)Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
≡ σD0(r, pˆ). (22)
Since increasing r (with pˆ fixed) makes a more generous subsidy policy, it may sound counter-
intuitive that (22) implies
∂σD0 (r,pˆ)
∂r < 0. Note that, in this section, increasing r simultaneously
reduces p as discussed after (21), thus resulting in the negative partial derivative.
The next proposition shows the relative efficiency of the different subsidy schemes in achiev-
ing a given government target (pˆ).
18In the following, an element of ψ˜X(p0) may be denoted by pbX(p0) to clarify that it is a best response to p0.
16
Proposition 2. Suppose Policies B, C, and D (with r ≤ r3) are all designed to attain pˆ (< p∗A) and
Q˜( pˆ, pˆ) in equilibrium. Then, as to the subsidy payment per unit under these policies, σD0(r, pˆ) <
σB( pˆ) < σC( pˆ). Specifically, the differences in subsidy payment (or, equivalently, in profits) per unit
of a good are as follows:
σB( pˆ)− σD0(r, pˆ) =
−rQ˜( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
> 0,
σC( pˆ)− σB( pˆ) =
( cQ˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜( pˆ, pˆ) + pˆQ˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
− 1
)(
− Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
)
> 0.
(23)
Proof. The results follow from (17), (19), and (22). 
Note that the difference in per-unit (per-firm, aggregate) subsidy payment equals the differ-
ence in per-unit (per-firm, aggregate, respectively) profits, because the three policies result in
the same price and quantity ( pˆ, Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)).
Proposition 2 shows that Policy D is the most efficient among the three subsidy schemes in
the sense that it achieves a given target pˆ and Q˜( pˆ, pˆ) with the least government spending,
and the difference increases with r. Additionally, in the typical case of less than full subsidy
pass-through under the specific subsidy (i.e., 0 > d( pˆ + σB( pˆ))
/
dpˆ = d−Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
/
dpˆ, where the
equality is due to (17)), the difference σB( pˆ)− σD0(r, pˆ) = r−Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ) decreases with pˆ. That is, as
the government aims at a larger reduction in the consumer price via subsidization, Policy D
becomes even more efficient than Policy B. Policy D can increase the output less expensively
because it makes the (inverse) demand curve faced by each firm i flatter (on the qi-pi plane)
and thus increases the own-price elasticity of demand relative to Policies A–C. Price-elastic
demand is a factor to incentivize a firm to lower the (producer) price in equilibrium, making
it easier for the government to induce a higher output. Similarly, as pointed out by Liang,
Wang and Chou (2017) with a homogeneous-Cournot model of quantity competition, Policy
B is more efficient than Policy C. In contrast to Policy D, the ad valorem subsidy (Policy C)
makes the demand faced by a firm less price-elastic, making it harder and more costly for the
government to induce the firm to lower the price and increase the output.
Next, I compare a firm’s profits at an opt-in Nash equilibrium p = p∗D0 = pˆ under Policy
D and the Pareto-best Nash equilibrium p = p∗A under Policy A (and potentially also under
Policy D). With the FOC under each case substituted, p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) = − (1−r)Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)
2
Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
and
p˜iA(p∗A, p
∗
A) = − Q˜(p
∗
A,p
∗
A)
2
Q˜1(p∗A,p
∗
A)
. Thus,
p˜iA(p∗A, p
∗
A)

< p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) if r < r1,
= p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) if r = r1,
> p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) if r > r1,
(24)
where r1 ≡ 1− Q˜(p
∗
A,p
∗
A)
2/Q˜1(p∗A,p
∗
A)
Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)2/Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
. Using r1, the next proposition gives a further analysis of
Nash equilibria under Policy D.
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r0
piD
−Q˜(p∗A, p∗A)2
/
Q˜1(p∗A, p
∗
A)
r1 r2 r3 1
−Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)2/Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
(= p˜iB( pˆ, pˆ; σB( pˆ)))
p˜iD0 ( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) = −(1− r)Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)2
/
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
p˜iA(p∗A, p
∗
A) = −Q˜(p∗A, p∗A)2
/
Q˜1(p∗A, p
∗
A)
Figure 3: Equilibrium profits and r under Policy D, conditional on pˆ
Proposition 3. Given pˆ (< p∗A), r1 < r2 (≤ r3). Therefore, by setting r to satisfy 0 < r < r1, r = r1,
and r1 < r ≤ r3 (and p by (21)), Policy D can make the profits at the opt-in Nash equilibrium with
p = p∗D0 = pˆ (that is, p˜iD( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) = p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ))) higher than, equal to, and lower
than, respectively, the profits at the Pareto-best Nash equilibrium under Policy A (that is, p˜iA(p∗A, p
∗
A)).
In particular, when r1 < r < r2, p = p∗D0 = pˆ is the Pareto-best Nash equilibrium under Policy D
and p˜iD( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) < p˜iA(p∗A, p
∗
A).
Proof. See the Appendix.

Figure 3 graphically summarizes the characteristics of the IPR subsidy as stated in Propo-
sitions 1–3. Conditional on pˆ, the figure plots a firm’s profits at two potential Nash equi-
libria under Policy D (p = p∗A or p = p
∗
D0 = pˆ) against r. Under Policy D, the equi-
librium p∗A, where every firm opts out of the IPR scheme by setting pi = p
∗
A and earns
p˜iD(p∗A, p
∗
A; r, p(r; pˆ)) = p˜iA(p
∗
A, p
∗
A) = −Q˜(p∗A, p∗A)2
/
Q˜1(p∗A, p
∗
A), exists if and only if r ∈
[r2, 1). For r ∈ (0, r2), no opt-out Nash equilibrium exists (i.e., pA /∈ FD for any pA ∈ FA,
including p∗A). Any pair of policy variables (r, p) with r ∈ (0, r3] and p determined by
(21) can induce the equilibrium p = p∗D0 = pˆ, where each firm opts in by setting pi = pˆ
and earns p˜iD( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) = p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) = −(1− r)Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)2
/
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ). The opt-in
equilibrium p = p∗D0 = pˆ always offers lower profits (or, equivalently, is realized with less
government spending) than the Policy B equilibrium p = p∗B = pˆ, where each firm earns
p˜iB( pˆ, pˆ; σB( pˆ)) = −Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)2
/
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ). Moreover, for r ∈ (0, r1) (r ∈ (r1, r3]), the opt-in prof-
its (with p = p∗D0 = pˆ) are higher (lower, respectively) than p˜iA(p
∗
A, p
∗
A). In particular, for
r ∈ (r1, r2), the firms would be better off if they could collude and jointly opt out of the IPR
subsidy to set pi = p∗A and earn p˜iA(p
∗
A, p
∗
A) per firm, but this is not a Nash equilibrium
and the prisoner’s dilemma ends them up with opting in to earn lower equilibrium profits
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−(1− r)Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)2/Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ) per firm.19 For r ∈ [r2, r3], both opt-in (p = p∗D0 = pˆ) and opt-out
(p = p∗A) are Nash equilibria under Policy D, but p = p
∗
A is more plausible since it gives each
firm higher profits than and thus Pareto-dominates p = p∗D0 = pˆ. Note that (r,piD) = (1, 0)
in Figure 3 corresponds to the corner (limit) solution resulting from the dual tax scheme
of Myles (1996), where the enforceability of the tax eliminates the above-mentioned opt-out
equilibrium p = p∗A and leads to the Ramsey pricing outcome of transferring all the economic
rents from the firms to the government through taxation.
It is clear from Figure 3 that the IPR subsidy can utilize the two policy variables to flexibly
control its incidence on the producers, unlike the specific or ad valorem subsidy. In attaining
the target outcomes (pˆ, Q˜( pˆ, pˆ), and associated consumer or social surplus) with the IPR
scheme, the policymaker can adjust the benefit or burden of the policy on the producers
by changing r in the range of (0, r2) (and p by (21)). If r ∈ (0, r1), Policy D increases both
consumer and producer surplus relative to the Policy A equilibrium p = p∗A. Thus, it is
subsidization for both the consumers and producers. On the other hand, for r ∈ (r1, r2),
although Policy D remains to offer the same benefits to the consumers, it works in effect
as taxation on the producers because their (Pareto-best) equilibrium profits decline relative
to the no subsidy case, and the differential is implicitly transferred to the government as a
reduction in government spending for inducing pˆ. In contrast, there is no such flexibility
with the specific or ad valorem form, because (17) and (19) mean that setting pˆ will uniquely
determine the (Pareto-best) equilibrium profits under each of Policies B and C.
With the flexibility provided by the IPR form, the incidence of the policy on producers can
be adjusted in line with its objectives and market situations. For example, if a target good
requires emerging, innovative technologies (e.g., electric vehicles), producers might have in-
curred significant fixed costs (e.g., R&D investment). Under these circumstances, the govern-
ment may want to support the innovative producers by allowing them significantly higher
profits than under no subsidy. On the other hand, if prior to government intervention the
market for a target good is relatively mature and served by a small number of firms earning
large economic rents due to imperfect competition, the government can use the IPR subsidy
to induce a larger output and at the same time bring down the oligopolists’ profits.
4 Simulating the Impact of the IPR Subsidy
4.1 Simulation Model
To illustrate the impact of the IPR structure in a more empirical setting, this section calibrates
the above symmetrically differentiated Bertrand oligopoly model according to the actual data
from the U.S. electric vehicle (EV) market, where buyers are eligible for a specific subsidy
19For the case of a monopoly (n = 1), the following changes should be made to Figure 3. The profit functions
piD0 and piA remain essentially the same as in Figure 3: piA(p
∗
A) = −Q(p∗A)2
/
Q1(p∗A) and piD0 ( pˆ) = −(1 −
r)Q( pˆ)2
/
Q1( pˆ). The optimal price set by the monopolist, p, equals pˆ when r ∈ (0, r1); pˆ and p∗A when r = r1; and
p∗A when r ∈ (r1, 1). This is because Policy D cannot make the firm worse off than piA(p∗A) = −Q(p∗A)2
/
Q1(p∗A)
as it always has the option of disqualifying the product for the IPR subsidy and earns −Q(p∗A)2
/
Q1(p∗A).
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(tax credit). The calibrated model is then used to simulate what would happen if the specific
subsidy form is replaced with other forms.
Following the argument in the previous sections, I particularly consider a hypothetical market
with a symmetrically differentiated logit demand system:
Q(pi, p−i) =
α exp(βpi)
1+∑nj=1 α exp(βpj)
∀i, (25)
where α > 0 and β < 0, and an outside option is included that can be a substitute for the
n goods. This demand system satisfies the conditions given at the beginning of Section 2
and is known to result in a unique, symmetric fixed point p∗X such that p
∗
X = ψ˜(p
∗
X) for each
X ∈ {A, B, C, D0} (see, e.g., Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992, Ch. 7), at which
Q˜(p∗X, p
∗
X) =
α exp(βp∗X)
1+ nα exp(βp∗X)
. (26)
To make policy simulations with this demand system realistic, the parameters α, β, and n (as
well as c) are set to reflect an actual market environment, as explained below.
I calibrate these parameters to the model year 2017 U.S. market data on small or midsize
EVs with 4–5 seats.20 First, the sales data identify the eight best-selling models in this mar-
ket, which are produced by eight distinct manufacturers (BMW, Fiat, Ford, General Motors,
Kia, Mercedes, Nissan, and Volkswagen) and account for almost all of the sales in this cat-
egory. The aggregate sales of the eight models are 50,981 and the (sales-weighted) average
price is $34,160 (without options; i.e., low cost/quality) or $38,799 (with options, if available;
i.e., high cost/quality). As EV buyers were eligible for the specific subsidy (tax credit) of
$7,500 in 2017, the (sales-weighted) average consumer price is $26,600 (= $34, 160− $7, 500)
or $31,299 (= $38, 799− $7, 500). Thus, the parameters of the logit model are set to result
in a Nash equilibrium that reflects these observed values (p∗B = $26, 660 or $31,299 and
q∗B ≡ Q˜(p∗B, p∗B) = 50, 981/n with the specific subsidy of z = $7, 500). Regarding the out-
side option, a reasonable choice for the case of the above EV models would be all the other
hybrid EVs and plug-in EVs, whose total sales is 500,096. In other words, the above eight
models account for about 9% of the hybrid EV and plug-in EV market. As for the supply
side, based on UBS Evidence Lab’s (2017) engineering estimates of the production cost of
Chevrolet Bolt (one of the eight models considered) with and without options, the following
simulations set the marginal production cost c = $27,315 (for the low cost/quality case) or
$29,885 (for the high cost/quality case). Lastly, I set n = 4.64 in (26), which is the equivalent
number of firms in accordance with the market shares of the eight models.21 Using these
values and (16) with pˆ = p∗B and z = $7, 500 pins down the demand parameters α and β in
20Vehicle sales and price data are constructed from the information available on the U.S. Department of
Energy’s websites (www.fueleconomy.gov and afdc.energy.gov/data) and EV-volumes.com (www.ev-volumes.
com).
21That is, a market with 4.64 equal-sized firms gives the same Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as observed in
the data. Using integer values (n = 4 or 5) gives very similar results (for example, at most a 0.4% difference in
the equilibrium consumer price relative to n = 4.64). Non-integer values of n are used in calibrations by, e.g.,
Bushnell (2007).
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(25).
Two sets of parameter values are used to check the robustness of the results against these
parameters. One set corresponds to a case in which the production cost and product quality
of the n goods are relatively low (c = $27, 315, α = 1.1688, and β = −0.1491× 10−3), and the
other set relatively high (c = $29, 885, α = 0.7902, and β = −0.1145× 10−3).
4.2 Simulation Results
Based on the demand and supply parameters obtained above, simulations are carried out to
derive and compare the Nash equilibria under various policies (Table 2). In simulation #1 of
Table 2, the three subsidy schemes (Policies B–D) are all designed to result in the same equi-
librium price and sales as targeted by the government (pˆ = $26, 660 for the low cost/quality
case or $31,299 for the high cost/quality case, and nqˆ ≡ nQ˜( pˆ, pˆ) = 50, 981). By construction,
the specific scheme (Policy B) with z = $7, 500 achieves the target price and sales. With no
subsidy, p∗A = $34, 071 and q
∗
A = 18, 004 (for the low cost/quality case) or p
∗
A = $38, 701 and
q∗A = 23, 070 (for the high cost/quality case). Thus, relative to the no-subsidy case (Policy A),
the specific subsidy lowers the consumer price by about $7,400 and raises the producer price
about $100 (i.e., subsidy pass-through is less than 100%), thus increasing the sales by 183%
(121%; hereafter, the values for the high cost/quality case are shown in parentheses), con-
sumer surplus by $236 million ($261 million), and the firms’ aggregate profits (producer sur-
plus) by $227 million ($251 million).22 The ad valorem subsidy (Policy C) with v = zc−z = 0.38
(0.34) induces the same ( pˆ, qˆ) and consumer surplus as Policy B. As indicated by Proposition
2, compared to the above specific subsidy, it needs $2,591 ($2,987) or 35% (40%) extra subsidy
payment per unit, adding to the producer price by the same amount ($2,591 ($2,987)) and
producer surplus by $132 million ($152 million).
Regarding the IPR subsidy (Policy D), simulation #1 shows the outcomes when r equals r1 or
r2 (as defined in Section 3) and induces ( pˆ, qˆ) at the Nash equilibrium p = p∗D0 = pˆ. Note that
r1 and r2 are selected just because they are thresholds, but any r ∈ (0, r2) can induce ( pˆ, qˆ) as
the Pareto-best (indeed, unique in the logit case here) Nash equilibrium under Policy D, with
a smaller r leading to larger equilibrium profits and government spending (see Figure 3). By
construction, r = r1 results in the same profits as Policy A. I examine r2 rather than r3 because
for r ∈ [r2, r3], the equilibrium p = p∗D0 = pˆ is implausible as it is Pareto-dominated (from
the firms’ perspective) by the opt-out equilibrium p = p∗A. The value of 0.65 (for the low
cost/quality case in simulation #1), for example, indicates that if the subsidy eligibility is met
(p < p), the policy (implicitly) compensates the producer with $0.65 for every $1 reduction in
the consumer price p.
The result associated with r1 is interpreted as follows. To induce all the firms to opt in to
the subsidy while assuring equilibrium profits at least as large as under Policy A, it must be
the case that r ≤ r1 and the subsidy payment per vehicle is not less than r1(p1 − pˆ), where
22For the calculation of consumer surplus in a logit framework, see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992,
Ch. 7).
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Table 2: Simulation Results
Simulation #1 Simulation #2
Cost and quality: Low High Low High
Policy A (no subsidy)
p∗A (consumer price = producer price; $) 34,071 38,701
nq∗A (market sales) 18,004 23,070
Policy B (specific)
p∗B (consumer price; $) 26,660 [1] 31,299 [2]
nq∗B (market sales) 50,981 [3] 50,981 [3]
z (= σB; subsidy/unit; $) 7,500 7,500 Same as in
p∗B + σB (producer price; $) 34,160 38,799 simulation #1
∆Consumer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 236 [4] 261 [5]
∆Producer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 227 251
Government outlay (σB × nq∗B; mil. $) 382 [6] 382 [6]
∆Social surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 81 [7] 130 [8]
Policy C (ad valorem)
p∗C (consumer price; $) 26,660
[1] 31,299 [2] 27,665 32,558
nq∗C (market sales) 50,981
[3] 50,981 [3] 44,462 44,694
v 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.26
vpˆ (= σC; subsidy/unit; $) 10,091 10,487 8,600 8,555
p∗C + σC (producer price; $) 36,751 41,786 36,265 41,113
∆Consumer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 236 [4] 261 [5] 188 201
∆Producer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 359 403 276 298
Government outlay (σC × nq∗C; mil. $) 514 535 382 [6] 382 [6]
∆Social surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 81 [7] 130 [8] 82 117
Policy D (IPR) with r = r1
p∗D0 (consumer price; $) 26,660
[1] 31,299 [2] 23,808 27,498
nq∗D0 (market sales) 50,981
[3] 50,981 [3] 74,345 74,987
r1 0.65 0.55 0.76 0.70
p1 ($) 31,328 35,960 30,547 34,796
r1(p1 − pˆ) (= σD0 ; subsidy/unit; $) 3,041 2,575 5,143 5,099
p∗D0 + σD0 (producer price; $) 29,701 33,874 28,951 32,597
∆Consumer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 236 [4] 261 [5] 413 498
∆Producer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 0 [9] 0 [9] 0 [9] 0 [9]
Government outlay (σD0 × nq∗D0 ; mil. $) 155 131 382 [6] 382 [6]
∆Social surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 81 [7] 130 [8] 31 116
Policy D (IPR) with r = r2
p∗D0 (consumer price; $) 26,660
[1] 31,299 [2] 23,714 27,327
nq∗D0 (market sales) 50,981
[3] 50,981 [3] 75,251 76,263
r2 0.67 0.57 0.79 0.73
p2 ($) 31,037 35,519 30,180 34,221
r2(p2 − pˆ) (= σD0 ; subsidy/unit; $) 2,925 2,410 5,081 5,014
p∗D0 + σD0 (producer price; $) 29,585 33,709 28,795 32,341
∆Consumer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 236 [4] 261 [5] 420 511
∆Producer surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) -6 -8 -10 -16
Government outlay (σD0 × nq∗D0 ; mil. $) 149 123 382 [6] 382 [6]
∆Social surplus (vs. Pol. A; mil. $) 81 [7] 130 [8] 27 113
The entries with a common superscript ([1], [2], · · · , or [9]) are equal by construction.
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p1 ≡ p(r1; pˆ) is as defined in footnote 17. In simulation #1, r1 is 0.65 (0.55) and r1(p1 − pˆ) is
$3,041 ($2,575). Put differently, under the constraint that each firm is not worse off than at the
no-subsidy equilibrium, switching from Policy B to Policy D can cut down the government
spending by up to 59% (66%) for attaining the same policy target. The producer price at
r = r1 is lower than p∗A by $4,370 ($4,827) in spite of the subsidy (“over-shifting” or over 100%
subsidy pass-through).
The result for the case of r = r2 can be interpreted similarly. To induce all the firms to opt in to
the subsidy (with equilibrium profits possibly lower than under Policy A), it must be the case
that r < r2 and the subsidy payment per vehicle is greater than r2(p2 − pˆ). In simulation #1,
r2 is 0.67 (0.57) and r2(p2 − pˆ) is $2,925 ($2,410). This subsidy payment is slightly below the
payment when r = r1, because equilibrium profits can now be lower than at the no-subsidy
equilibrium (as is the case for r ∈ (r1, r2)). In other words, by switching from Policy B to Policy
D in such a way to keep the firms from opting out and still meet the same policy target, the
government can cut down the subsidy budget by up to 61% (68%) relative to Policy B. As
expected, over-shifting occurs and producer surplus is somewhat lower than under Policy A
by $6 million ($8 million).
Simulation #2 compares the subsidy schemes from a different but related perspective. Instead
of obtaining the subsidy payment under each scheme that is necessary to achieve the target
sales level nqˆ = 50, 981 (as simulation #1 did), simulation #2 computes the sales level under
each scheme that is realized with the fixed subsidy budget of $382 million, which is, by
construction, what Policy B with z = $7, 500 needs to induce nqˆ = 50, 981 ($382 million
= z × nqˆ). As Policy C is less efficient than Policy B (Proposition 2), Policy C attains 13%
(12%) less sales with this budget than Policy B. On the other hand, Policy D is more efficient
than Policy B (Proposition 2). Thus, according to the simulation for r = r1 = 0.76 (0.70),
subject to the condition that Policy D results in a unique equilibrium where every firm opts
in and makes at least the same profits as in the Policy A equilibrium, Policy D induces up
to 46% (47%) larger sales with the given budget than Policy B (74,345 (74,987) vs. 50,981).
This means that under Policy D with r = r1, the consumer price, $23,808 ($27,498), and
subsidy payment per unit, $5,143 ($5,099), are lower than under Policy B ($26,660 ($31,299)
and $7,500, respectively). Consumer surplus, as a result, increases by $177 million ($237
million) relative to the specific subsidy. Lastly, according to the simulation for r = r2 , given
a weaker constraint that the opt-in equilibrium is a unique equilibrium, Policy D with the
given budget and with r2 marginally less than 0.79 (0.73) can extend the equilibrium sales
some more: 48% (50%) larger than Policy B. Thus, the consumer price and subsidy payment
per unit are even lower and consumer surplus even higher than in the previous case of
r = r1 = 0.76 (0.70). Producer surplus decreases by $10 million ($16 million) relative to
Policy A and Policy D with r = r1.
Though possibly looking counter-intuitive at first sight, it is not surprising that social surplus
in simulation #2 is larger under Policies B and C than under Policy D. Note that social surplus
in Table 2 equals consumer surplus + producer surplus − government outlay, so externalities
are not explicitly considered (see footnote 15). Social surplus (with externalities ignored) is
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maximized when the consumer price is made equal to the marginal cost c = $27,315 ($29,885)
to eliminate the under-supply due to imperfect competition. A subsidy-induced consumer
price lower than c (as in simulation #2, Policy D) is justified by the existence of positive
externalities associated with the sale/consumption of the target good (e.g., reduced pollutant
emissions, R&D spillovers and so on for the case of EVs). If we compare Policy B and Policy
D (simulation #2, r = r1) with taking externalities into account, positive externalities greater
than $2,159 ($593) per unit of a good make Policy D (r = r1) preferred to Policy B in terms
of social surplus (with externalities considered). Note that $2,159 ($593) is much smaller than
the subsidy per unit of $5,143 ($5,099) under Policy D (simulation #2, r = r1).
Overall, the simulations have found the substantial impacts of the IPR form (Policy D) as
suggested by the theoretical framework in the previous sections. It saves the government
expenditure for achieving a given target nqˆ = 50, 981 by up to 61% (68%), compared to the
specific form. Stated differently, with a given subsidy budget ($382 million), the IPR form can
induce up to 48% (50%) more sales than the specific form. At the same time, the government
can flexibly affect the policy’s incidence on the firms through its choice of policy variables. By
letting r ≈ 0, the IPR subsidy is (almost) equivalent to the specific subsidy (as shown in Figure
3) and can increase the firms’ aggregate profits by up to $227 million ($251 million) relative
to the case of no government intervention. On the other hand, as r approaches r2, it works
as implicit taxation on the firms by making the firms’ profits up to $10 million ($16 million)
lower than under no government intervention (according to simulation #2). The government
can flexibly set producer surplus within this range depending on whether and how much it
wants to subsidize or tax the producers.
5 Extension: Product Quality
The simple IPR form as discussed above could deter improvements in product quality by
making them more costly: an increase in the (pre-subsidy) price of a product due to higher
production costs associated with better quality reduces the subsidy payment for the product.
Note that we face the same disincentive regularly through the widely-used ad valorem taxation
because it levies an additional tax payment on a better-quality product with a higher cost and
(pre-tax) price (Keen, 1998). In these cases, while a policy-driven increase in the (producer)
price elasticity of demand induces a price reduction, thereby allowing the government to
more efficiently attain its target, it also motivates a firm to lower product quality as a simple
way to cut the cost and price. This issue is obviously shared by the generalized tax forms of
Myles (1996), Hamilton (1999), and Carbonnier (2014) that are designed to make the demand
faced by a monopolist/oligopolist more elastic, although product quality is out of the scope
of these papers. This section considers how the IPR subsidy can be adjusted to deal with the
issue of product quality. In short, the disincentive can be curbed by increasing pi with quality.
I supplement the cost and demand functions with quality as follows, while maintaining the
basic structure of the model in Section 2.1. Note that identical firms and a symmetrically
differentiated demand system are not assumed in this section. While the following model
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deals with one-dimensional quality for the sake of simplicity, similar results are obtained
with multi-dimensional quality, as discussed in Appendix B. The unit production cost of
good i depends on its quality wi ∈ R+: ci = ci(wi) with c′i(wi) > 0 and c′′i (wi) > 0.
Demand functions are derived by adding wi to the setup of Section 2 (footnote 6). Sup-
pose that a unit of good i with quality wi increases a representative consumer’s utility
by f (wi), where f ′(wi) > 0 and f ′′(wi) < 0. The representative consumer’s utility due
to product quality (aggregated over the n products) is ∑ni=1 f (wi)qi. By adding this term
to U(x, q1, · · · , qn) = x + u(q1, · · · , qn) of footnote 6, her total utility is now expressed as
U(x, {wi, qi}i=1,··· ,n) = x + u(q1, · · · , qn) + ∑ni=1 f (wi)qi. Given {wi, pi}i=1,··· ,n, she solves the
following utility maximization problem:
max
x,q1,··· ,qn
x + u(q1, · · · , qn) +
n
∑
i=1
f (wi)qi s.t. x +∑
i
piqi ≤ I. (27)
Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions are ∂u(q1,··· ,qn)∂qi = pi − f (wi) ∀i. This
means that the demand for each good depends on {pi − f (wi)}i=1,··· ,n, i.e., qi = Qi(p1 −
f (w1), · · · , pn − f (wn)) for each i (note that qi = Qi(p1, · · · , pn) in Section 2). Put differently,
pi =
∂u(q1,··· ,qn)
∂qi
+ f (wi), so f (wi) is considered the premium attributable to product i’s quality
or, in other words, the consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for quality.
[Policy A]
First, let us consider the determination of Nash equilibrium prices and qualities in the base-
line case of no subsidy. Given the qualities and prices of the other products (w−i and
p−i), firm i sets wi and pi simultaneously to maximize its profits piiA(wi, pi, w−i, p−i) =
[pi − ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i), where hj = pj − f (wj) and h−i is a vector of hj’s for all the prod-
ucts other than product i. Assuming an interior solution, the following FOCs are satisfied:
∂piiA
∂wi
= −c′i(wi)Qi(hi, h−i)− f ′(wi)[pi − ci(wi)]
∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
= 0, (28)
∂piiA
∂pi
= Qi(hi, h−i) + [pi − ci(wi)]∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
= 0. (29)
Substituting (29) into (28) shows that the optimal quality w∗iA satisfies
f ′(w∗iA) = c
′
i(w
∗
iA). (30)
The optimal quality w∗iA is uniquely determined because f
′′ − c′′i < 0. It equates the marginal
price (= marginal utility) and marginal cost of quality improvement and maximizes the net
value of quality, f − ci. Note, however, that maximizing f − ci is not needed for the social
optimum if product quality is associated with externalities, which is typically the very reason
for subsidization. Given {w∗iA, ci(w∗iA)}i=1,··· ,n, Nash equilibrium prices, which satisfy (29) for
each i, are determined as in Section 2.1, and the results of Section 2.1 about Policy A apply
analogously to the current setting with quality.
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[Policies B and C]
Under Policies B and C, profits are respectively given by piiB(wi, pi, w−i, p−i) = [pi + z −
ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i) and piiC(wi, pi, w−i, p−i) = [(1 + v)pi − ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i). Following the
same steps as above, it is straightforward to find that the equilibrium qualities (w∗iB and w
∗
iC)
are respectively determined by
f ′(w∗iB) = c
′
i(w
∗
iB), (31)
(1+ v) f ′(w∗iC) = c
′
i(w
∗
iC). (32)
Thus, the specific subsidy maintains the same equilibrium quality as no subsidy (w∗iA = w
∗
iB)
because it does not distort the effective cost of quality improvement, while the ad valorem
subsidy lowers the effective cost of quality improvement and thus leads to better quality than
with no subsidy (w∗iC > w
∗
iA). Given the equilibrium qualities of all firms, Nash equilibrium
prices are determined as in Section 2.1.
[Policy D]
Suppose that each firm’s threshold pi is determined by the government as a function of
wi, i.e., pi = p(wi). Assuming a sufficiently generous subsidy scheme, we focus on Nash
equilibria where all firms opt in and thus piiD = piiD0 . As above, consider maximizing
piiD0(wi, pi, w−i, p−i) = [(1− r)pi + rp(wi)− ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i) with respect to wi and pi. As-
suming an interior solution, the following FOCs are satisfied:
∂piiD0
∂wi
= [rp′(wi)− c′i(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i)− f ′(wi)[(1− r)pi + rp(wi)− ci(wi)]
∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
= 0.
(33)
∂piiD0
∂pi
= (1− r)Qi(hi, h−i) + [(1− r)pi + rp(wi)− ci(wi)]∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
= 0. (34)
(33) and (34) imply that the optimal quality w∗iD0 satisfies
(1− r) f ′(w∗iD0) = c′i(w∗iD0)− rp′i(w∗iD0), (35)
where it is assumed for simplicity that w∗iD0 is uniquely determined.
23 (35) means that the
policymaker can affect the realized quality by adjusting the gradient p′(·). For example, (30)
and (35) imply that if p(·) is constant, as in previous sections, then the optimal product quality
is lower than in the no-subsidy case (w∗iD0 < w
∗
iA). As another example, increasing pi linearly
with wi (i.e., p′i(wi) = a (> 0) for all wi) improves w
∗
iD0 relative to the case of constant pi. With
{w∗iD0 , ci(w∗iD0)}i=1,··· ,n determined by (35), Nash equilibrium prices, which satisfy (34) for all
i, are determined as discussed in Section 2.1.
Importantly, whereas the gradient p′(·) appears in (35), the level p(·) does not. As a result,
(35) does not restrict the policymaker’s ability to choose the level of p(·) and influence the
23For example, assume that r and p(·) are set in such a way that keeps (1− r) f + rp− ci strictly concave.
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equilibrium prices {p∗iD0}i=1,··· ,n through (34). Hence, augmenting Policy D by making pi
dependent on quality does not affect the previous results without product quality.
Following the above argument, let us consider a few examples to which the IPR form can
be applied. First, various subsidy programs are in place today across countries to encour-
age the faster diffusion of green durable goods such as renewable energy systems, low-
emission vehicles, energy-efficient home appliances, and energy-saving building renovations
(e.g., solar PV and EV subsidies discussed above). Information is often available about en-
ergy/environmental and other attributes of these goods, enabling the policymaker to set pi
as a function of these attributes (Appendix B shows that the above model can be extended to
the case of multi-dimensional attributes).24 In fact, a number of specific or ad valorem subsidy
schemes on these products link subsidy payment to product quality (e.g., U.S. federal tax
credits for plug-in hybrid vehicles increase with battery capacity). For actual implementa-
tion of the scheme, low dimensionality of product attributes would be preferable for keeping
the schedule p(·) relatively simple and manageable (for example, designing such a schedule
would be easier for solar PV systems than for EVs).
Second, actual pharmaceutical drug regulations/subsidies have similarities to the quality-
adjusted IPR subsidy discussed above. In many countries, the consumer’s out-of-pocket
price for a pharmaceutical drug is set below the unregulated level through negotiations
between the policymaker and the producer, and in return, the drug is eligible for a gov-
ernment subsidy. The regulated price and subsidy rate depend on such factors as product
quality/characteristics (e.g., clinical effectiveness), production costs, and the prices of similar
drugs (OECD, 2008; Paris and Belloni, 2013). With theoretical models based on the negotia-
tion process, Johnston and Zeckhauser (1991) and Wright (2004) suggest the possibility that
the government can take advantage of its bargaining with pharmaceutical firms and inter-
firm strategic interaction to induce lower drug prices (higher consumer surplus) and, at the
same time, flexibly adjust producer surplus, two features that are also realized by the IPR
scheme.25
Besides, many countries adopt reference pricing policies to contain fast-growing public spend-
ing on drugs (e.g., Acosta et al., 2014). In these policies, drugs are clustered based on chemi-
cal, pharmacological, or therapeutic equivalence criteria, and a reference price is set for each
cluster. The reimbursement for each drug linearly increases with its price but is capped at
the reference price of the corresponding cluster, providing a downward pressure on the price
when it is above the reference price. Note that this design is similar to the quality-adjusted
IPR subsidy in that the subsidy rule switches at the threshold price and the threshold depends
on product quality, though subsidy payment in reference pricing policies is non-decreasing in
the product price, unlike the IPR subsidy. Altogether, these observations about pharmaceu-
tical drug regulations/subsidies show similarities to the IPR form, suggesting that it could
24Additionally, economic/engineering/scientific estimates are often available about WTP for product charac-
teristics (by means of, e.g., hedonic regressions or discrete choice models) and positive externalities (e.g., the value
of carbon emissions reductions), providing useful benchmarks for setting pi as a function of product attributes.
25Wright (2004) points out that in practice the government does not well exploit the second function in the
negotiations, as it often simply benchmarks the subsidy level (and thus firm profitability) against foreign markets.
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be applied to these cases by, for example, letting pi constant within each cluster and variant
across clusters.
6 Conclusion
This paper has been motivated by a unique structure of a government subsidy program in
Japan, in which a rebate is paid for the purchase of a target product (residential solar PV
system) conditional on the price being below a threshold, and the rebate amount increases as
the price is further reduced. Transaction data show that the design was helpful for achiev-
ing the government’s aim of lowering (post- and) pre-rebate prices and thus boosting the
sales. To my knowledge, this type of subsidy policy has not previously been studied in the
literature, In this paper, I provide a theoretical foundation for such a policy design and ex-
plore its effectiveness. Specifically, I consider a particular scheme (termed the IPR scheme) in
which subsidy payment is conditional on the product’s price being less than a government-
set threshold and increases as the price further goes down, in proportion to the difference
between the threshold and price.
With a model of imperfect competition (Bertrand oligopoly with product differentiation), I
find that the IPR subsidy has two advantages over the widely-used specific or ad valorem
subsidy. First, it is more efficient in the sense that it can induce a given level of output (the
government’s target) with less government expenditure than the other forms (or, equivalently,
it can induce a larger sales with a given government budget). Second, while achieving this
target, the government can also seek a second goal of affecting the incidence of the policy on
the producers: depending on the policy parameters set by the government, firm profits can
be increased or decreased relative to the no-subsidy benchmark case.
Calibrations based on the data from the U.S. EV market indicate the substantial magnitude of
these advantages. With a given government budget ($382 million), the IPR form can induce
up to 48%–50% higher market sales of the target products than the specific form. Additionally,
depending on the policymaker’s choice of policy variables, the IPR form with the same budget
can flexibly adjust producer surplus in the range of $227–$251 million higher and $10–$16
million lower than under no subsidy.
Lastly, an issue with the IPR form is the producer’s disincentive to quality improvement,
as better quality and associated higher production costs reduces the subsidy payment. By
extending the theoretical model and specifically considering product quality, the paper dis-
cusses a simple way to curb and correct the disincentive: making the price threshold for
subsidy eligibility increase with quality, and thus rewarding a higher-quality product with a
larger subsidy payment. Examples of products to which the quality-adjusted IPR scheme is
applicable include green durable goods (such as solar PV systems) and pharmaceutical drugs.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Given p−i ∈ ∏j 6=i[cj, pmax], let K be the interval defined by K ≡ [0, inf{pi|Qi(pi, p−i) =
0}] and Fi : K×R++ → R be the function defined by Fi(pi, xi) = (pi − xi)Qi(pi, p−i). Then, Fi
has strictly increasing differences in (pi, xi) on K ×R++ because for (pi, xi) ∈ K ×R++ and
(p′i, x
′
i) ∈ K×R++ such that pi > p′i and xi > x′i ,[
(pi − xi)Qi(pi, p−i)− (p′i − xi)Qi(p′i, p−i)
]− [(pi − x′i)Qi(pi, p−i)− (p′i − x′i)Qi(p′i, p−i)]
= (xi − x′i)
[
Qi(p′i, p−i)−Qi(pi, p−i)
]
> 0,
(36)
where the last line follows because Qi is strictly decreasing in i’s own price on K. Let
βi(xi) = arg maxpi∈[xi ,pmax ]∩K Fi(pi, xi). The minimum of the constraint set ([xi, p
max] ∩ K =
[xi, inf{pi|Qi(pi, p−i) = 0}]) is increasing in xi, and so is the maximum (trivially). Hence,
Topkis’s (1978) monotonicity theorem (see Amir, 2005, Theorem 1) implies that if xi > x′i and
bi ∈ βi(xi) and b′i ∈ βi(x′i), then bi ≥ b′i . Given p−i ∈ ∏j 6=i[cj, pmax], note that ψiA(p−i, ci) =
βi(ci), ψiB(p−i, ci, z) = βi(ci − z), ψiC(p−i, ci, v) = βi( ci1+v ), and ψiD0(p−i, ci, r, pi) = βi( ci−rpi1−r )
(for clarity purposes, I have made explicit the dependence of the best response correspon-
dences on the parameters ci, z, v, r, and pi). Also, ci > ci − z, ci > ci1+v , and ci > ci−rpi1−r . Hence,
the statement of the lemma follows. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Given pi ≥ p′i and p−i ≥ p′−i (i.e., pj ≥ p′j for all j 6= i), it suffices to show ∆ ≡
piiD(pi, p−i)piiD(p′i, p
′
−i)− piiD(p′i, p−i)piiD(pi, p′−i) ≥ 0.
If pi > p′i ≥ pi, it follows from (11) and footnote 7 that
∆ = piiA(pi, p−i)piiA(p′i, p
′
−i)− piiA(p′i, p−i)piiA(pi, p′−i) ≥ 0. (37)
If pi ≥ pi > p′i, it analogously follows from (11) and footnote 7 that
∆ = piiD0(pi, p−i)piiD0(p
′
i, p
′
−i)− piiD0(p′i, p−i)piiD0(pi, p′−i) ≥ 0. (38)
If pi > pi > p
′
i, it follows from (11) and (2) that
∆ = piiA(pi, p−i)piiD0(p
′
i, p
′
−i)− piiD0(p′i, p−i)piiA(pi, p′−i)
= (pi − ci)Qi(pi, p−i)[p′i + r(pi − p′i)− ci]Qi(p′i, p′−i)
− [p′i + r(pi − p′i)− ci]Qi(p′i, p−i)(pi − ci)Qi(pi, p′−i)
= (pi − ci)[p′i + r(pi − p′i)− ci][Qi(pi, p−i)Qi(p′i, p′−i)−Qi(p′i, p−i)Qi(pi, p′−i)]
≥ 0.
(39)
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Therefore, if pi ≥ p′i and p−i ≥ p′−i, then ∆ ≥ 0 in any case.

A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First, Lemma 5 below is proved, which is to be used in the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 5. For pbiA ∈ ψiA(p−i) and pbiD0 ∈ ψiD0(p−i), Gi(p−i) ≥ 0 implies pbiA ≥ pi, and Gi(p−i) ≤
0 implies pbiD0 ≤ pi. Equivalently, pbiA < pi implies Gi(p−i) < 0, and pbiD0 > pi implies Gi(p−i) > 0.
Proof. Suppose pbiA < pi. Then,
piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) ≥ piiD0(pbiA, p−i)
= [(1− r)pbiA + rpi − ci] ·Qi(pbiA, p−i)
= [pbiA − ci] ·Qi(pbiA, p−i) + r[pi − pbiA] ·Qi(pbiA, p−i)
= piiA(pbiA, p−i) + r[pi − pbiA] ·Qi(pbiA, p−i)
> piiA(pbiA, p−i),
where the last line follows from Qi(pbiA, p−i) > 0. Thus, Gi(p−i) < 0. In other words, if
Gi(p−i) ≥ 0, then pbiA ≥ pi.
Similarly, suppose pbiD0 > pi. Then,
piiA(pbiA, p−i) ≥ piiA(pbiD0 , p−i)
= [pbiD0 − ci] ·Qi(pbiD0 , p−i)
> [pbiD0 − ci] ·Qi(pbiD0 , p−i) + r[pi − pbiD0 ] ·Qi(pbiD0 , p−i)
= [(1− r)pbiD0 + rpi − ci] ·Qi(pbiD0 , p−i)
= piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i),
where the third line follows from Qi(pbiD0 , p−i) > 0. Thus, Gi(p−i) > 0. In other words, if
Gi(p−i) ≤ 0, then pbiD0 ≤ pi. 
By the definition of piiD(pi, p−i) in (11),
max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD(pi, p−i) ≤ max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
{max{piiA(pi, p−i),piiD0(pi, p−i)}}. (40)
Suppose Gi(p−i) > 0. By definition, this means that
piiA(pbiA,p−i) ≡ max
pi∈[ci ,pmax ]
piiA(pi, p−i) = max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiA(pi, p−i)
> piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) ≡ max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD0(pi, p−i),
(41)
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so that piiA(pbiA, p−i) = maxpi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
{max{piiA(pi, p−i),piiD0(pi, p−i)}}. Also, Lemma 5
and Gi(p−i) > 0 imply pbiA ≥ pi. Thus, it follows from (11) that piiD(pbiA, p−i) = piiA(pbiA, p−i).
Therefore, noting (40), we find max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD(pi, p−i) = piiD(pbiA, p−i) = piiA(p
b
iA, p−i)
or, equivalently, ψiD(p−i) = ψiA(p−i).
Similarly, suppose Gi(p−i) < 0. By definition, this means that
piiA(pbiA,p−i) ≡ max
pi∈[ci ,pmax ]
piiA(pi, p−i) = max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiA(pi, p−i)
< piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) ≡ max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD0(pi, p−i),
(42)
so that piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) = maxpi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
{max{piiA(pi, p−i),piiD0(pi, p−i)}}. Also, Lemma
5 and Gi(p−i) < 0 imply pbiD0 ≤ pi. Then, it follows from (11) that piiD(pbiD0 , p−i) =
piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i). Therefore, noting (40), we find maxpi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD(pi, p−i) = piiD(pbiD0 , p−i) =
piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) or, equivalently, ψiD(p−i) = ψiD0(p−i).
Lastly, Gi(p−i) = 0 means that
piiA(pbiA,p−i) ≡ max
pi∈[ci ,pmax ]
piiA(pi, p−i) = max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiA(pi, p−i)
= piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) ≡ max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD0(pi, p−i),
(43)
so that piiA(pbiA, p−i) = piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) = maxpi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
{max{piiA(pi, p−i),piiD0(pi, p−i)}}.
Also, Lemma 5 and Gi(p−i) = 0 imply pbiA ≥ pi and pbiD0 ≤ pi. Then, it follows from (11)
that piiD(pbiA, p−i) = piiA(p
b
iA, p−i) and piiD(p
b
iD0 , p−i) = piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i). Therefore, noting
(40), we find max
pi∈[ ci−rpi1−r ,pmax ]
piiD(pi, p−i) = piiD(pbiA, p−i) = piiD(p
b
iD0 , p−i) = piiA(p
b
iA, p−i) =
piiD0(p
b
iD0 , p−i) or, equivalently, ψiD(p−i) = ψiA(p−i) ∪ ψiD0(p−i).

A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The first result follows immediately from Lemma 3. As for the second result, Lemma
5 and pA ∈ FD ∩ FA imply p ≤ pA. Similarly, Lemma 5 and pD0 ∈ FD ∩ FD0 imply pD0 ≤ p.
Thus, pD0 ≤ p ≤ pA. The result about p˜iD follows from footnote 13. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. When the other firms set a common price p0, an optimal response pbD0 ∈ ψ˜D0(p0) =
ψD0(p0, · · · , p0) is characterized by the FOC, (1− r)Q˜(pbD0 , p0)+ [(1− r)pbD0 + rp− c]Q˜1(pbD0 , p0) =
0. Substituting (21) into the FOC gives
Q˜(pbD0 , p0) +
[
pbD0 − pˆ−
Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ)
]
Q˜1(pbD0 , p0) = 0. (44)
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By applying the envelope theorem to p˜iD0(p
b
D0 , p0; r, p(r; pˆ)) ≡ piD0(pbD0 , p0, · · · , p0; r, p(r; pˆ)) =
[(1− r)pbD0 + rp− c]Q˜(pbD0 , p0) with noting that p = [c−
Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)
Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ)
− pˆ]/r + Q˜( pˆ,pˆ)Q˜1( pˆ,pˆ) + pˆ by (21),
we have
dp˜iD0(p
b
D0 , p0; r, p(r; pˆ))
dr
=
(− pbD0 + Q˜( pˆ, pˆ)Q˜1( pˆ, pˆ) + pˆ)Q˜(pbD0 , p0)
=
Q˜(pbD0 , p0)
2
Q˜1(pbD0 , p0)
< 0,
(45)
where the second line follows from (44). Then,
dG˜(p0; r, p(r; pˆ))
dr
= −dp˜iD0(p
b
D0 , p0; r, p(r; pˆ))
dr
> 0. (46)
Lemma 6. Given r and p, if there exists some pˇ such that G˜( pˇ; r, p) = 0, then
G˜(p0; r, p)

≤ 0 for all p0 < pˇ,
= 0 for p0 = pˇ,
≥ 0 for all p0 > pˇ.
(47)
Proof. By the envelope theorem, dp˜iA(p
b
A,p0)
dp0
= [pbA − c]Q˜2(pbA, p0), where pbA ∈ ψ˜A(p0), and
dp˜iD0 (p
b
D0
,p0;r,p)
dp0
= [(1− r)pbD0 + rp− c]Q˜2(pbD0 , p0). Thus,
dG˜(p0; r, p)
dp0
= [pbA − c]Q˜2(pbA, p0)− [(1− r)pbD0 + rp− c]Q˜2(pbD0 , p0)
= [pbA − c]Q˜(pbA, p0)
Q˜2(pbA, p0)
Q˜(pbA, p0)
− [(1− r)pbD0 + rp− c]Q˜(pbD0 , p0)
Q˜2(pbD0 , p0)
Q˜(pbD0 , p0)
≥
{
[pbA − c]Q˜(pbA, p0)− [(1− r)pbD0 + rp− c]Q˜(pbD0 , p0)
} Q˜2(pbA, p0)
Q˜(pbA, p0)
= G˜(p0; r, p)
Q˜2(pbA, p0)
Q˜(pbA, p0)
,
(48)
where the inequality holds because Q˜2(p
b
A,p0)
Q˜(pbA,p0)
≥ Q˜2(p
b
D0
,p0)
Q˜(pbD0 ,p0)
due to the property of increasing
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differences of log Q in (pi, p−i).26 Then, it follows from (48) that
dG˜(p0; r, p)
dp0
> 0 if G˜(p0; r, p) > 0,≥ 0 if G˜(p0; r, p) = 0, (50)
which implies (47).

As G˜( pˆ; r3, p(r3; pˆ)) = 0 and pˆ < p∗A, Lemma 6 implies G˜(p
∗
A; r3, p(r3; pˆ)) ≥ 0. Then, (46) and
G˜(p∗A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)) = 0 implies r2 ≤ r3.
By (46) and G˜(p∗A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)) = 0, G˜(p
∗
A; r, p(r; pˆ)) < 0 for all r < r2 and G(p
∗
A; r, p(r; pˆ)) > 0
for all r > r2. Therefore, Lemma 4 implies that p∗A /∈ FD for all r < r2, and p∗A ∈ FD for all
r ≥ r2. In addition, as pA < p∗A for any other pA ∈ FA, G˜(pA; r2, p(r2; pˆ)) ≤ 0 (by Lemma 6
and G˜(p∗A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)) = 0), so that G˜(pA; r, p(r; pˆ)) < 0 for all r < r2 and thus pA /∈ FD for all
r < r2.
Similarly, by (46) and G˜( pˆ; r3, p(r3; pˆ)) = 0, G˜( pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) < 0 for all r < r3 and G( pˆ; r, p(r; pˆ)) >
0 for all r > r3. Therefore, Lemma 4 implies that pˆ ∈ FD for all r ≤ r3, and pˆ /∈ FD for all
r > r3.
Hence, the three statements of the proposition follow.

A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. By the definitions of r1 and r2, p˜iA(p∗A, p
∗
A) = p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r1, p(r1; pˆ)) = p˜iD0(p
b
D0(p
∗
A), p
∗
A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)).
By the envelope theorem,
dp˜iD0 (p
b
D0
(p0),p0;r,p)
dp0
= [(1− r)pbD0(p0) + rp − c]Q˜2(pbD0(p0), p0) > 0.
Then, pˆ < p∗A means p˜iD0( pˆ, pˆ; r1, p(r1; pˆ)) < p˜iD0(p
b
D0(p
∗
A), p
∗
A; r1, p(r1; pˆ)), which means
p˜iD0(p
b
D0(p
∗
A), p
∗
A; r2, p(r2; pˆ)) < p˜iD0(p
b
D0(p
∗
A), p
∗
A; r1, p(r1; pˆ)) by the first sentence of this proof.
This implies r1 < r2 because
dp˜iD0 (p
b
D0
(p0),p0;r,p(r;pˆ))
dr < 0 by (45). The remaining statements fol-
low from Proposition 1 and (24).

26By using (4),
∂
Q˜2(pi ,p0)
Q˜(pi ,p0)
∂pi
=
1
Q˜2
[
Q˜Q˜12 − Q˜1Q˜2
]
=
n− 1
Q2
[
Q(pi, pj, p−ij)×
∂2Q(pi, pj, p−ij)
∂pi∂pj
− ∂Q(pi, pj, p−ij)
∂pi
× ∂Q(pi, pj, p−ij)
∂pj
]∣∣∣∣
(pj ,p−ij)=(p0,··· ,p0)
≥ 0.
(49)
In addition, pbA ≥ pbD0 by Lemma 1. Therefore,
Q˜2(pbA ,p0)
Q˜(pbA ,p0)
≥ Q˜2(p
b
D0
,p0)
Q˜(pbD0 ,p0)
.
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B Multi-Dimensional Quality
This appendix extends the model of Section 5 to the case of multi-dimensional quality. Over-
all, multiple product attributes can be analyzed in analogous steps and leads to similar results.
The unit production cost of good i depends on its K-dimensional attributes wi ∈ RK+ and is
expressed as ci(wi), where the function ci : RK+ → R+ has such properties that ∂ci(wi)∂wki > 0 ∀wi
for each attribute k ∈ {1, · · ·K} and ∇2ci(wi) is positive definite for all wi (so ci(·) is
strictly convex). As for demand, a unit of good i with quality wi increases a representa-
tive consumer’s utility by f (wi), where the function f : RK+ → R+ has such properties that
∂ f (wi)
∂wki
> 0 for each k and ∇2 f (wi) is negative definite for all wi (so f (·) is strictly con-
cave). As in the single attribute case, the representative consumer’s utility due to product
quality (aggregated over the n products) is ∑ni=1 f (wi)qi, and her total utility is expressed as
U(x, {wi, qi}i=1,··· ,n) = x + u(q1, · · · , qn) +∑ni=1 f (wi)qi. Given {wi, pi}i=1,··· ,n, she solves the
following utility maximization problem:
max
x,q1,··· ,qn
x + u(q1, · · · , qn) +
n
∑
i=1
f (wi)qi s.t. x +∑
i
piqi ≤ I. (51)
Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions are ∂u(q1,··· ,qn)∂qi = pi − f (wi) ∀i. This
means that the demand for each good depends on {pi − f (wi)}i=1,··· ,n, i.e., qi = Qi(p1 −
f (w1), · · · , pn − f (wn)) for each i. Put differently, pi = ∂u(q1,··· ,qn)∂qi + f (wi), so f (wi) is con-
sidered the premium attributable to product i’s quality or, in other words, the consumer’s
willingness to pay (WTP) for quality.
[Policy A]
First, let us consider the determination of Nash equilibrium prices and qualities in the baseline
case of no subsidy. Given the qualities and prices of the other products, firm i sets wi and
pi simultaneously to maximize its profits piiA(wi, pi, {wj, pj}j 6=i) = [pi − ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i),
where hi = pi − f (wi) and h−i is a vector of hj’s for all the products other than product i.
Assuming an interior solution, the following FOCs are satisfied:
∂piiA
∂wki
= −∂ci(wi)
∂wki
Qi(hi, h−i)− [pi − ci(wi)]∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
∂ f (wi)
∂wki
= 0 ∀k, (52)
∂piiA
∂pi
= Qi(hi, h−i) + [pi − ci(wi)]∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
= 0. (53)
Substituting (53) into (52) shows that the optimal quality w∗iA satisfies
∇ f (w∗iA)−∇ci(w∗iA) = 0. (54)
The optimal quality w∗iA is uniquely determined because f − ci is strictly concave. It equates
the marginal price (= marginal utility) and marginal cost of quality improvement for each
attribute and maximizes the net value of quality, f − ci. Note, however, that maximizing f − ci
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is not needed for the social optimum if some attributes are associated with externalities, which
is typically the very reason for subsidization. Given {w∗iA, ci(w∗iA)}i=1,··· ,n, Nash equilibrium
prices, which satisfy (53) for each i, are determined as in Section 2.1, and the results of Section
2.1 about Policy A apply analogously to the current setting with quality.
[Policies B and C]
Under Policies B and C, profits are respectively given by piiB(wi, pi, {wj, pj}j 6=i) = [pi + z−
ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i) and piiC(wi, pi, {wj, pj}j 6=i) = [(1 + v)pi − ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i). Following the
same steps as above, it is straightforward to find that the equilibrium qualities (w∗iB and w
∗
iC)
are respectively determined by
∇ f (w∗iB)−∇ci(w∗iB) = 0, (55)
(1+ v)∇ f (w∗iC)−∇ci(w∗iC) = 0. (56)
Thus, the specific subsidy maintains the same equilibrium quality as no subsidy (w∗iA = w
∗
iB)
because it does not distort the effective cost of quality improvement, while the ad valorem
subsidy lowers the effective cost of quality improvement and thus leads to better quality in
terms of WTP and the unit production cost (that is, f (w∗iA) < f (w
∗
iC) and ci(w
∗
iA) < ci(w
∗
iC)).
27
Given the equilibrium qualities of all firms, Nash equilibrium prices are determined as in
Section 2.1.
[Policy D]
Suppose that each firm’s threshold pi is determined by the government as a function of
wi, i.e., pi = p(wi). Assuming a sufficiently generous subsidy scheme, we focus on Nash
equilibria where all firms opt in and thus piiD = piiD0 . As above, consider maximizing
piiD0(wi, pi, {wj, pj}j 6=i) = [(1− r)pi + rp(wi) − ci(wi)]Qi(hi, h−i) with respect to wi and pi.
Assuming an interior solution, the following FOCs are satisfied:
∂piiD0
∂wki
= [r
∂p(wi)
∂wki
− ∂ci(wi)
∂wki
]Qi(hi, h−i)− [(1− r)pi + rp(wi)− ci(wi)]∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
∂ f (wi)
∂wki
= 0 ∀k,
(59)
∂piiD0
∂pi
= (1− r)Qi(hi, h−i) + [(1− r)pi + rp(wi)− ci(wi)]∂Qi(hi, h−i)
∂hi
= 0. (60)
27From (54) and (56), w∗iA 6= w∗iC. Since w∗iA is a unique maximizer of f (wi)− ci(wi),
f (w∗iA)− c(w∗iA) > f (w∗iC)− c(w∗iC). (57)
Similarly, since w∗iC is a unique maximizer of (1+ v) f (wi)− c(wi),
(1+ v) f (w∗iC)− ci(w∗iC) > (1+ v) f (w∗iA)− ci(w∗iA). (58)
With (57) and (58), (1 + v) f (w∗iC) − ci(w∗iC) > f (w∗iC) − ci(w∗iC) + v f (w∗iA), so f (w∗iC) > f (w∗iA). From (57),
ci(w∗iC)− ci(w∗iA) > f (w∗iC)− f (w∗iA) > 0, so ci(w∗iC) > ci(w∗iA).
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(59) and (60) imply that the optimal quality w∗iD0 satisfies
(1− r)∇ f (w∗iD0)−∇ci(w∗iD0) + r∇p(w∗iD0) = 0, (61)
where it is assumed for simplicity that w∗iD0 is uniquely determined.
28 (61) means that the
policymaker can affect the realized quality by adjusting the gradient ∇p(·). For example, (54)
and (61) imply that if pi is independent of wi (i.e., ∇p(wi) = 0 ∀wi), then the optimal product
quality (denoted by w˜∗iD0) is lower than in the no-subsidy case in terms of WTP and the unit
production cost: f (w∗iA) > f (w˜
∗
iD0) and ci(w
∗
iA) > ci(w˜
∗
iD0).
29 On the other hand, setting
∇p(wi) = ∇ f (wi) ∀wi makes (54) and (61) equivalent and the equilibrium attributes remain
the same with or without the subsidy (w∗iD0 = w
∗
iA), although such a rule may be impractical
(or if externalities exist, even unnecessary for the social optimum).
As another illustration, consider p(wi) that is linear in each argument (and non-zero) (i.e.,
∇p(wi) = a ( 6= 0) for all wi). This linear schedule induces the optimal quality w∗iD0 such that
p(w∗iD0) > p(w˜
∗
iD0),
29 so w∗iD0 lies above the hyperplane through w˜
∗
iD0 that is perpendicular
to a (i.e., a · (w∗iD0 − w˜∗iD0) > 0).30 In addition, if the policymaker is interested in improving
a particular attribute k (because of, for example, positive externalities associated with it),
increasing ak (the kth element of a) raises its equilibrium quality (i.e., ∂wk∗iD0
/
∂ak > 0).31
With {w∗iD0 , ci(w∗iD0)}i=1,··· ,n determined by (61), Nash equilibrium prices, which satisfy (60)
for all i, are determined as discussed in Section 2.1. Importantly, whereas the gradient ∇p(·)
appears in (61), the level p(·) does not. As a result, (61) does not restrict the policymaker’s
ability to choose the level of p(·) and influence the equilibrium prices {p∗iD0}i=1,··· ,n through
(60). Hence, augmenting Policy D by making pi dependent on quality does not affect the
previous results without product quality.
28For example, assume that r and p(·) are set in such a way that keeps (1− r) f + rp− ci strictly concave.
29This can be proved as in footnote 27.
30More generally, given a (possibly nonlinear) schedule p(wi) (where ∇p(w˜∗iD0 ) 6= 0), the optimal quality w∗iD0
satisfies p(w∗iD0 ) > p(w˜
∗
iD0 ), ∇p(w˜∗iD0 ) · (w∗iD0 − w˜∗iD0 ) > 0, and ∇p(w∗iD0 ) · (w∗iD0 − w˜∗iD0 ) > 0.
31Conditional on r, the optimal quality w∗iD0 is determined by the FOC (61) with ∇p(wi) = a. By the implicit
function theorem, w∗iD0 is expressed as a function of a (let w
∗
iD0 = g(a)), and ∇g(a) = −r[(1− r)∇2 f (w∗iD0 )−
∇2ci(w∗iD0 )]−1. As ∇2 f (w∗iD0 ) is negative definite and ∇2ci(w∗iD0 ) is positive definite, ∇g(a) is positive definite,
so that the diagonal elements of ∇g(a) are positive (that is, ∂wk∗iD0
/
∂ak > 0).
